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Preface 
 
In this dissertation, my aim is to examine three different aspects of financial aid policy in 
the United States. In the first essay, I discuss federal student loan policies and how changes to 
these policies have contributed to the emergence of student loan use in the financial aid system. 
The second essay examines the student-level consequences associated with an institutional 
decision that is influenced by a federal policy that can prohibit colleges’ receipt of funding from 
federal financial aid programs. In the final essay, Susan Dynarski and I provide a retrospective 
on the federal government’s attempts to simplify the financial aid application process and 
examines the feasibility for future policy reform. The following paragraphs further elaborate the 
motivation behind each essay.  
I started working on my Master’s degree in Higher Education Administration at the 
University of Michigan in 2007, and the first class I attended was Public Policy in Higher 
Education with Steve DesJardins.* One of the readings for this class was an ASHE Reader 
chapter by James Hearn that was published in 1998 and explored the history of federal policy on 
student loans from 1965 to 1992. Given what I knew from my previous work, I remember 
thinking that the article was outdated because so much has happened since 1992. This was 
something that Steve even pointed out in class and suggested the need for an updated paper. 
When I started my doctoral education and attended conferences where researchers presented on 
student loans, I was amazed that many of them did not have any background or contextual 
                                                
* In fact, the first day of this class also coincided with the first day of kindergarten for Steve’s daughter Grace. I 
always told Steve that I’m in trouble if Grace finished high school before I finished graduate school. Lucky I 
finished before Grace started the eighth grade. 
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knowledge on the policies surrounding student loans. Thinking back to the chapter from Steve’s 
class, I realized that there was little existing information for researchers that documented the 
changes in student loan policies since 1992. The first essay of this dissertation attempts to fill 
this void by updating Hearn’s previous article and examining the student loan policy changes 
that have transpired since 1992. Most importantly, I highlight the political and economic factors 
that influenced these changes and provide a lens into understanding how these changes have 
contributed to the popularity of students’ use of loans to pay for college.  
 Before graduate school, I worked as a policy analyst at a student loan guaranty agency. A 
large portion of my job was dedicated to reading and interpreting federal financial aid regulations 
to ensure that schools and lenders were in compliance. Over time, my job expanded to 
monitoring Congressional activities and keeping my colleagues up to date on pending legislation. 
In doing this, I noticed that Congress or the Department of Education would acknowledge that 
students were borrowing more than the decade before, but did little to address the issue and 
instead would suggest that borrowing a federal loan was a good investment. A common response 
would be that the amount of student loan debt accrued is equal to the amount of a car loan. This 
exposure to the federal policymaking process piqued my interest in understanding the legislative 
rationale behind the creation of financial aid policies that can have a profound effect on the way 
students pay for college. Yet, despite the common assumption among policymakers and those in 
the financial aid community that loans are a good thing, there was little empirical evidence to 
support the notion that student loans help improve students’ academic performance and 
persistence while in college. In the second essay of this dissertation, I attempt to shed light on 
this issue. Using administrative data, I exploit the variation in the loan policies from 50 
community colleges that are part of a statewide system. Less than half of these community 
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colleges participate in the Stafford loan program, which provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the impact of student loan use on student-level outcomes. 
 I started working with Susan Dynarski in 2009. Her prior research with Judith Scott-
Clayton examined how the process of applying for financial aid could be simplified, which I had 
read prior to attending graduate school. What intrigued me the most about their research dealt 
with how they argued that an individual’s lack of college knowledge (their ability to understand 
the process and procedures necessary to enroll in college) can significantly hinder their 
opportunities to participate and thrive in a post-secondary environment. This resonated with the 
stories I had heard from colleagues who worked in a college planning center, as one of their 
primary functions was to help fill out the FAFSA free of charge for any person who was 
interested in going to college. They told me that many of the individuals who utilized their 
services were utterly confused about how to complete the FAFSA, and that they didn’t know 
how people in these circumstances could do it successfully without some kind of assistance. 
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton’s research garnered a positive response from policymakers and even 
provided some impetus from the federal government to simplify the process. Yet despite these 
efforts, barriers still exist. In the final essay, Susan Dynarski and I provide a retrospective on 
these simplification efforts and examine the possibility of future reform that would allow 
students’ and their families to use older tax information to determine the amount of money they 
are expected to contribute to college.  
 The national conversation in the United States around higher education seems to be 
undergoing a shift. Because of the rising cost of college, student loan debt exceeding $1 trillion 
dollars, and the underemployment of many college graduates, some individuals seem to be 
questioning whether the pursuit of a college degree is worth the expense, while others may 
viii 
 
wonder how to go about obtaining the federal aid needed to pay for a degree. Through this 
dissertation, I aim to shed light not only on what federal policies have led to the current 
circumstances around college finance, but also provide insight on the impacts of financial aid on 
students and how, through an innovative shift in policy, college can become more accessible to 
all.  
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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines three different aspects of financial aid policy in the United 
States. The first essay describes the evolution of federal student loan policies from 1992 to 2014. 
Over time, the federal government’s support for higher education has evolved financial aid from 
being grant-based to a student loan centric system. In the early 1970’s, student loans accounted 
for less than half of federal expenditures. Today, student loans represent almost two-thirds. In 
1998, James Hearn published a book chapter describing the history of federal student loan policy 
to establish context for the emergence of student loan use. Since the publication of Hearn’s 
chapter, the policies of surrounding student loans and financial aid have changed dramatically. In 
this chapter, I trace the history of federal student loan policies from the last two decades and 
highlight the political and economic issues that motivated those policy changes, and how the 
legacy of those changes shape current financial aid policy.  
In the second essay, I investigate the student-level impacts associated with the decision of 
community colleges to opt out of the Stafford loan program. The degree to which students are 
able to make adequate repayments on their student loans and avoid default is of special concern 
for colleges. If too many former students go into default, the college will face sanctions by the 
federal government and lose eligibility to provide currently enrolled students federal financial 
aid, such as the Pell grant. To avoid these sanctions, some colleges have chosen not to participate 
in federal loan programs by excluding loans from students’ financial aid packages. In this 
chapter, I investigate the student-level impacts associated with the decision of community 
colleges to opt out of the Stafford loan program. Utilizing administrative records from over 50 
xviii 
 
community college located in a single state, I estimate the within college differences in outcomes 
for Pell-eligible students before and after an institution opts out of the federal loan program. I 
find that Pell-eligible students enrolling when the community college offered federal loans are 
7.6 percentage points more likely to borrow than Pell-eligible students who enrolled when the 
institutions opted out. Overall borrowing also increases by $386 a year. I also find that students 
borrowing a loan attempted 19 additional credits in their first year of enrollment and were more 
likely to attempt and complete math and science courses than non-borrowers. 
The final essay, co-authored with Susan Dynarski, provides a five-year retrospective of 
what has changed in the aid application process, what has not, and the possibilities for reform. 
Each year, fourteen million households seeking federal aid for college complete a detailed 
questionnaire about their finances, the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). At 
116 questions, the FAFSA is almost as long as IRS Form 1040 and substantially longer than 
Forms 1040EZ and 1040A. Aid for college is intended to increase college attendance by 
reducing its price and loosening liquidity constraints. Economic theory, empirical evidence and 
common sense suggest that complexity in aid could undermine its ability to affect schooling 
decisions. Using data from the nationally representative 2007-08 National Postsecondary Student 
Aid Survey (NPSAS), we examine how the distribution of aid would change if applicants could 
use older tax information. For example, a student applying in early 2012 for aid for 2012-13 
could use IRS data from tax year 2010, rather than 2011. We find that using “prior-prior” tax 
information has little effect on aid eligibility, with 65 percent of applicants seeing zero change in 
their Pell eligibility and 75 percent seeing a change of less than $500.  
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Chapter 1. A History of Federal Student Loan Policy from 1992 to 
2014: An Update to Hearn (1998) 
 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
 In recent years, student loans have received significant attention in both popular media 
and policy discourses. Outstanding student loan debt in the United States now exceeds $1 
trillion. Media outlets feature stories about individuals who graduated from college with 
exceedingly high debt, and then suggest that the “student loan bubble” will follow a similar path 
to the housing bubble that occurred in the mid- to late-2000s. Indeed, the share of students 
utilizing student loans to finance their college education has substantially increased over the past 
several decades. Between 1995-96 and 2011-12, the share of undergraduates borrowing a loan 
increased from 26 percent to 42 percent, with the average loan amount growing from $5,655 to 
$7,223 (adjusted for inflation) (National Center for Education Statistics, 2015). Today, almost 
two-thirds of students are graduating from college with an average debt load greater than 
$28,000 (The Institute for College Access & Success, 2014b).  
 Existing research offers several explanations for the increasing share of students 
borrowing and the resulting debt. The first explanation deals with escalating college tuition 
prices and the inability of need-based grants to keep pace (Callan, 2001; Hearn & Holdsworth, 
2004). Another explanation points to the increase in college enrollment rates, with a larger share 
of students having fewer financial resources to pay for college and taking a longer time to 
graduate (Baum, 2015; Institute of Education Statistics, 2012) .  The third explanation highlights 
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federal financial aid policy, and how current policies are structured to encourage student loan 
borrowing (Best & Best, 2014; Mettler, 2014; Mumper, 1996).   
In 1998, James Hearn published a book chapter that examined the history of federal 
student loan policy to establish the context for the emergence of student loan use. Hearn outlined 
student loan policies from the inception of the federal loan program to the early 1990s. Yet, since 
the publication of Hearn’s chapter, federal financial aid policies have changed dramatically. 
Some of these changes include the introduction of new federal financial aid programs and tax 
credits, increases in student loan limits, and alterations to interest rates.  
In this paper, I extend Hearn’s work by tracing the history of student loan policy from 
1992 to the present and highlighting the political and economic forces that motivated the policy 
changes. In his chapter, Hearn stated that it was important to review and understand the history 
of federal loan policy in order to illuminate “why particular paths were taken and how the legacy 
of taking those paths shapes contemporary policies” (p. 47). Given the significant growth in 
student loan borrowing over the past two decades, these words are no less true today.   
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 1.2, I describe the types of loans that 
students can borrow. Section 1.3 provides an overview of financial aid programs, highlights the 
growth in student loan expenditures, and discusses the trends in student loan borrowing. Section 
1.4 profiles federal student loan policy from 1992 to 2014. In Section 1.5, I offer concluding 
thoughts on the factors contributing to student loan use and the issues that have lead to a national 
outstanding student loan debt of over $1 trillion. 
1.2. Background on Student Loans 
 
 Before discussing student loan trends, it is important to specify the types of loans 
available to students. In general, federal student loans are offered through three different 
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programs - Perkins, Stafford, and Parental Loans for Undergraduate Students (PLUS).1 Perkins, 
the first federal loan program, was created through the National Defense Education Act of 1958.2 
Perkins loans are campus-based, wherein the federal government provides institutions with the 
capital to lend low-interest loans directly to students. Colleges can collect on the loan and then 
re-lend the money to another student. Perkins loans are subsidized, meaning the federal 
government pays the interest on the loan while the student is enrolled in college. The current 
interest rate is 5 percent and the annual loan limit is $5,500. 
The Stafford loan program was created through the Higher Education Act of 1965, which 
was a part of President Johnson’s War on Poverty.3 From 1993 to 2010, Stafford loans were 
provided to students either directly by the federal government (called the William D. Ford Direct 
Loan Program) or through private banks and lenders that received subsidy guarantees from the 
federal government (called the Federal Family Education Loan Program or FFEL). With Stafford 
loans, students can borrow a subsidized or unsubsidized loan. Like Perkins loans, the federal 
government pays the interest on subsidized Stafford loans while the borrower is in school. With 
unsubsidized Stafford loans, the interest rate begins accruing when the funds are disbursed to the 
student. Prior to 1992, unsubsidized loans were provided only to independent students through 
the Supplemental Loans for Students (SLS), which was created as part of the 1986 
Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act. Unsubsidized loans replaced SLS during the 1992 
Reauthorization and allowed any student to borrow, regardless of income or dependency status.    
There are annual and aggregate limits on the Stafford loan amounts that students can 
borrow. Table 1.1 displays the loan limits from the past two decades (Smole, 2013). Currently, 
                                                
1 Information on who qualifies for a Stafford loan and the various repayment plans are provided in Appendices 1.A 
and 1.B.  
2 Prior to 1986, the Perkins loan program was called the National Defense Student Loan (NDSL) program. 
3 Prior to 1987, the Stafford loan program was called the Guaranteed Student Loan (GSL) program.  
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the subsidized loan limit is $3,500 for the first year, $4,500 for the second year, and $5,500 for 
subsequent years. The annual limit (total subsidized and unsubsidized) varies by dependency 
status. For example the first year annual loan limit for dependent students is $5,500 and $9,500 
for independents. The aggregate loan limit also varies by dependency status. The total amount 
students can borrow is $31,000 for dependents and $57,500 for independents. 
 
Table 1.1. Federal Stafford Loan Limits 
  Dependent Students  Independent Students 
  Subsidized 
Stafford 
Total Subsidized & 
Unsubsidized Stafford 
 Subsidized 
Stafford 
Total Subsidized & 
Unsubsidized Stafford 
Jan. 1987 – Sept. 1992     
 1st year 2,625 n/a  2,625 6,625 
 2nd year 2,625 n/a  2,625 6,625 
 3rd year and beyond 4,000 n/a  4,000 8,000 
       
 Aggregate Limit 17,250 n/a  17,250 37,250 
Oct. 1992 – June 2007     
 1st year 2,625 2,625  2,625 6,625 
 2nd year 3,500 3,500  3,500 7,500 
 3rd year and beyond 5,500 5,500  5,500 10,500 
       
 Aggregate Limit 23,000 23,00  23,000 46,000 
July 2007 – June 2008     
 1st year 3,500 3,500  3,500 7,500 
 2nd year 4,500 4,500  4,500 8,500 
 3rd year and beyond 5,500 5,500  5,500 10,500 
       
 Aggregate Limit 23,000 23,000  23,000 46,000 
July 2008 – current     
 1st year 3,500 5,500  3,500 9,500 
 2nd year 4,500 6,500  4,500 10,500 
 3rd year and beyond 5,500 7,500  5,500 12,500 
       
 Aggregate Limit 23,000 31,000  23,000 57,500 
Note: Table displays the annual and aggregate loan limits for Stafford Loans. The aggregate limit on total subsidized 
and unsubsidized loans for independent students also includes SLS loan limits that were available until Oct. 1992.  
Source: Smole (2013) 
 
 
 
The PLUS loan program, created though the 1980 Reauthorization of the Higher 
Education Act, allows parents to borrow a loan to help pay for their child’s postsecondary 
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education. Unlike Stafford loans, PLUS loans require a credit check.4 Payments on PLUS loans 
begin immediately, but parents do have access to various deferments and forbearances to delay 
repayment.  
Federal statute establishes the interest rates for Stafford and PLUS loans. Figure 1.1 
displays the interest rates from 1992 to 2015 (Smole, 2013). Later I will discuss how the interest 
rate formula changed numerous times over the past two decades. In short, the interest rate was 
variable from 1992 to 2006 and was calculated based on the bond equivalent rate of the 91-day 
Treasury bill plus a premium. All Stafford and PLUS loans disbursed after July 1, 2006 are fixed 
interest rate loans.  
 
Figure 1.1. Interest Rate for Stafford and PLUS Loans 
 
Note: Figure displays the in-repayment interest rate for subsidized and unsubsidized loans. 
From 1995-2006, the in-school interest rate was approximately .6 percentage points lower 
than the in-repayment interest rate. The interest rate for PLUS after 2006 is for the Direct 
PLUS loan program. From 2006 to 2010, the FFEL PLUS interest rate was fixed at 8.5 
percent.  
Source: Smole (2013) 
                                                
4 In the case of a parent having an adverse credit history and is unable to borrow a PLUS loan, the dependent student 
has the opportunity to borrow at the same annual loan limit (total subsidized and unsubsidized) as an independent 
student. 
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 Some students borrow private loans not backed by the federal government. Many states, 
employers, and postsecondary institutions offer students loans with terms and interest rates on 
par with federal loans. However, educational loans provided by private banks typically represent 
the bulk of non-federal loans (College Board, 2014b). These private loans require a credit check 
or co-signer with terms that can vary, and interest rates are traditionally higher than the Stafford 
loan interest rates. Also, private loans do not provide borrowers the same flexible repayment and 
forbearance options available for federal loans. The amount of private loans a student can borrow 
is often limited to the cost of attendance, but some banks may allow loan amounts to cover 
expenses that are not calculated in the cost of attendance (McSwain, Price, & Cunningham, 
2006).5 
1.3. Trends in Student Loan Expenditures, Borrowing, and Repayment 
 
 In addition to student loans, federal support for financial aid is offered through grants, 
work-study, veterans and military benefits, and education tax credits.6 Financial aid is also 
provided through various state, institutional, and employer supported programs. Table 1.2 
displays the programs that have subsidized college costs for college undergraduates over the past 
two decades (College Board, 2014b). For the 1992-93 academic year, the total amount of 
financial aid awarded to college undergraduates was roughly $51 billion, $32 billion of which 
came from the federal government. Two decades later, the total amount increased four-fold to 
$209 billion, with the federal government contributing $131 billion.   
 The more recent growth in financial aid has been largely attributed to the spending 
increases in the Pell grant. As Table 1.2 illustrates, Pell expenditures more than doubled between 
2005-06 and 2010-11. Despite its funding increase, however, the Pell grant maximum has not  
                                                
5 Cost of attendance is the tuition and fees that institutions charge students as well as other expenses related to 
obtaining a higher education. These expenses could include room and board, books, and transportation. 
6 More information on these federal aid programs is provided in Appendix 1.C.  
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Table 1.2. Financial Aid Funding for Undergraduate Students 
 (Selected Years, in Billions) 
  
1992-93 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11 2012-13 
Federal Grants $11.51 $9.50 $11.80 $16.41 $40.43 $33.76 
 
Pell Grants $10.27 $8.38 $10.76 $15.17 $38.23 $32.69 
 
SEOG $0.96 $0.89 $0.84 $0.93 $0.81 $0.75 
 
LEAP $0.12 $0.10 $0.05 $0.08 $0.07 - 
 
ACG - - - - $0.59 - 
 
SMART Grants - - - - $0.46 - 
 
Other Grants $0.16 $0.13 $0.15 $0.22 $0.27 $0.33 
       Federal Work-Study $0.91 $0.85 $1.13 $1.04 $0.93 $0.88 
        Federal Loans $17.90 $28.08 $31.97 $47.00 $76.01 $69.38 
 
Subsidized Stafford Loans $11.19 $16.17 $15.29 $19.80 $31.00 $28.35 
 
Unsubsidized Stafford Loans $0.27 $7.09 $10.41 $15.91 $32.87 $30.12 
 
PLUS Loans $1.83 $3.16 $4.99 $9.78 $11.35 $10.03 
 
Perkins Loans $1.23 $1.29 $1.23 $1.45 $0.72 $0.82 
 
Other Loans $3.38 $0.38 $0.05 $0.05 $0.07 $0.06 
       Federal Veterans and Military $2.07 $2.08 $2.29 $3.97 $10.66 $11.77 
Federal Education Tax Benefits - - $4.89 $6.47 $17.03 $14.81 
        Total Federal Aid $32.39 $40.51 $52.08 $74.89 $145.05 $130.61 
        State Grants $4.07 $4.35 $6.17 $8.21 $9.77 $9.62 
Institutional Grants  $10.47 $12.32 $16.36 $22.16 $32.30 $36.17 
Employer Grants $3.63 $2.92 $5.40 $7.48 $9.40 $10.03 
Non-Federal Loans - $0.74 $5.09 $17.36 $6.98 $8.13 
        Total Aid $50.57 $60.84 $89.99 $136.56 $220.53 $209.37 
Note: Table represents total aid provided to undergraduate students (aid for graduate students is excluded). All 
values in 2013 dollars.  
Source: College Board (2014b) 
 
 
 
kept pace with rising tuition rates, which have outpaced inflation since the 1980s (College Board, 
2014a). From 1993-94 to 2012-13, the purchasing power of the maximum Pell grant declined 
from 37 percent to 30 percent of tuition at public four-year colleges (College Board, 2014b).   
Despite the growth in federal grants, federal loans have consistently represented 50 
percent or more of all federally supported aid programs since the 1980s. Figure 1.2 traces 
spending on federal grants and loans as a share of total federal aid from 1970-71 to 2011-12. 
Throughout the 1970s, grants accounted for more than half of federal aid. Today, grants 
represent less than a third.  
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Figure 1.2. Federal Grants and Loans as a Share of Total Federal Aid 
 
Source: College Board (2014b) 
 
 
 
From 1992-93 to 2011-12, federal support for loans has increased four-fold from $18 
billion to $69 billion (see Table 1.2). Significant growth occurred with the introduction of 
unsubsidized loans in 1992. Unsubsidized loans represented less than 2 percent of all federal 
loans in 1992-93; by 2012-13, 43 percent of federal loans were unsubsidized. Parental Loans for 
Undergraduate Students (PLUS) have also increased nearly five fold over the past two decades. 
Perkins loans represent a small portion of federal loan programs and the spending on Perkins has 
slowly declined. This decline, however, is masked by the significant rise in unsubsidized and 
PLUS spending.  
Non-federal loans also experienced notable growth in the mid-2000s. By 2005-06, non-
federal sources of aid represented more than 12 percent of all financial aid and, at $17.36 billion, 
non-federal loan volume was higher than Pell volume. With the market collapse in 2008 and the 
increase in federal loan maximums (which will be discussed later), non-federal loan volume 
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declined to less than $10 billion in 2012-13.  
1.3.1. Growth in Student Loan Borrowing & Debt 
 
Reflecting the increase in federal student loan spending, there has been a substantial 
increase in undergraduate borrowing over the past two decades. As Table 1.3 indicates, between 
1995-96 and 2007-08 the percentage of all undergraduates who borrowed a loan increased from 
26 percent to 42 percent. During the same time period, borrowers’ average annual loan amount 
rose from $5,655 to $7,223.  
The use of loans differs by institutional sector. In both time periods, students at for-profit 
institutions borrowed at a higher rate than students at other institutions, yet the average loan 
 
 
Table 1.3. Share and Average Annual Amount of Undergraduate Borrowing 
 1995-96  2011-12 
 
Share 
Borrowing 
Average Loan 
(per student) 
Average Loan 
(per borrower)  
Share 
Borrowing 
Average Loan 
(per student) 
Average Loan 
(per borrower) 
Total 25.7% $1,456 $5,655  41.8% $3,019 $7,223 
        Institution Type 
       Public 2-year 4.8% $164 $3,431  17.6% $836 $4,764 
   Public 4-year 38.2% $2,170 $5,676  50.0% $3,604 $7,208 
Private 4-year 48.2% $3,144 $6,529  62.3% $5,375 $8,634 
For-Profit 60.4% $3,423 $5,666  72.8% $5,769 $7,919 
        Race/Ethnicity 
       White 25.5% $1,467 $5,747  41.8% $3,040 $7,266 
African American 31.4% $1,668 $5,317  52.0% $3,772 $7,250 
Hispanic or Latino 22.7% $1,260 $5,538  35.5% $2,485 $7,005 
Asian or Pacific Islander 21.6% $1,208 $5,598  29.0% $2,063 $7,113 
American Indian or 
Alaska Native 23.4% $1,285 $5,482  42.1% $2,760 $6,555 
        Income Quartile 
       Lowest 35.8% $2,013 $5,625  44.9% $3,034 $6,751 
Lower Middle 30.0% $1,715 $5,708  47.6% $3,351 $7,041 
Upper Middle 24.0% $1,341 $5,581  42.3% $3,143 $7,424 
Highest 14.1% $811 $5,744  32.8% $2,567 $7,822 
Notes: Author’s calculations using National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS) data from the PowerStats 
web tool. Share borrowing and loan amounts include federal and non-federal loans. Amounts are in 2013 dollars. 
Source: National Center for Education Statistics (2015) 
 
 
10 
 
amount is consistently higher at private four-year institutions. For all sectors, there has been a 
significant increase in the share of students borrowing over time. For example, in 1995-96, 4.8 
percent of students at public two-year institutions took out a student loan. This increased to 17.6 
percent in 2011-12. The sector with the largest growth is 4-year private institutions—the share of 
students borrowing rose 14.1 percentage points (see Table 1.3 for details).  
The likelihood of borrowing and the amount of money borrowed also differs by 
race/ethnicity and income. While minority and lower income students are more likely to borrow, 
the loan amount they borrow is less, on average, than their peers. In both 1995-96 and 2011-12, 
African Americans had the highest share of student borrowers. Yet, conditional on borrowing, 
Whites had the highest average loan amount in the two time periods. Students in the lowest 
quartile of the income distribution had the highest share of students borrowing in 1995-96, 
roughly 36 percent. By 2011-12, the income the group with the highest share shifted to the lower 
middle quartile; 48 percent of these students took out a loan. Students in the highest quartile had 
the lowest share of students borrowing, but, among student loan borrowers, had the largest 
average loan amounts at $5,744 in 1995-96 and $7,822 in 2011-12.  
The increasing annual share of students borrowing and the rise in loan amounts has led to 
a significant increase in students graduating with debt. As Table 1.4 displays, the share of 
baccalaureate recipients with debt increased from 55 percent in 1992-93 to 71 percent in 2011-12 
(Hershbein & Hollenbeck, 2014; 2015; as cited in Lochner & Monge-Naranjo, 2015). The 
average cumulative loan debt per graduate also grew three times larger from $7,300 to $21,200. 
When the sample is restricted to those graduates who borrowed, the average loan debt more than 
doubled from $13,200 to $29,700.  
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Table 1.4. Student Loan Debt for Baccalaureate Graduates 
  
Average Loan Average Loan 
Year Graduating Share Borrowing (per graduate) (per borrower) 
1990 54.5% $7,200 $13,200 
1996 52.6% $9,200 $17,600 
2000 63.6% $14,400 $22,600 
2004 65.6% $14,800 $22,600 
2008 68.2% $17,200 $25,200 
2012 71.0% $21,220 $29,700 
Notes: Table adapted from Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2015). Amounts are in 2013 dollars. 
Share borrowing and loan amounts include federal and non-federal loans.  
Source: Hershbein and Hollenbeck (2014, 2015) 
 
 
 
1.3.2. Increasing Number of Borrowers Are Struggling to Repay Debt 
 
As both the percentage of students who borrow and the average loan debt with which 
students graduate have increased, the consequences of a financial aid system increasingly 
predicated on loans are becoming apparent. Troublingly, research suggests that a significant 
number of individuals are struggling to repay their student loans. In 2014, nearly 11 percent of 
student debt was 90 days delinquent or in default (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2015). 
Estimates of delinquency or default rates are even larger for particular cohorts. Of the students 
who entered repayment in 2005, for example, nearly 26 percent had become delinquent and 15 
percent had defaulted at some point within the first five years of repayment (Cunnhinghum & 
Kienzl, 2011).  
The default rate is commonly used to gauge students’ ability to repay.7 Figure 1.3 
displays the official cohort default rates for Stafford loan borrowers. After a slow decline in 
default rates between the mid-1990s and the mid-2000s, the default rate started to rise 
dramatically in 2007, which coincides with the start of the Great Recession. Prior to 2014, 
                                                
7 The default rate measure is calculated from the share of borrowers entering repayment and failed to make a loan 
payment for a certain number of days. Prior to 1985, borrowers were identified as being in default if they had not 
made a loan payment for more than 120 days. The definition of default changed from 120 days to 180 in 1985, and 
then to the now current 270 days in 1998. 
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default rates were based on borrowers’ first two years of repayment. Under this calculation, 
default rates increased from 5 percent in 2006 to 10 percent in 2011. When the default rate 
calculations were changed in 2014 to include the first three years of repayment, the increase in 
defaults became even more pronounced. For example, the default rate was officially 10 percent 
in 2011, but under the three year measure the rate was 14.1 percent. Although the recent rise in 
the default rate coincided with the onset of the Great Recession, estimates suggest that economic 
recovery alone is unlikely to reverse the trend. According to the U.S. Department of Education 
(2015), the projected default rate for loans originating in 2016 is 25 percent.  
 
Figure 1.3. National Cohort Default Rate 
 
Source: U.S. Department of Education (2014f) 
 
 
 
1.4. Policy History of Federal Student Loans After 1992 
 
 In 1965, President Johnson signed into law the Higher Education Act (HEA). The intent 
of the HEA was to remove financial barriers to college access and ensure that individuals 
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wanting to go to college would have financial support from the federal government to do so. To 
keep the HEA up to date, Congress periodically amends and reauthorizes provisions within the 
bill. Prior to 1992, the HEA was amended and reauthorized in 1972, 1978, 1980, and 1986. Over 
time, Congressional action to increase access to higher education with the introduction of new 
HEA financial aid programs has significantly expanded the federal government’s role in higher 
education. The HEA accounts for over 60 percent of all financial aid available to students, and a 
significant portion of this aid is in the form of student loans.  
The following section provides a detailed history of federal loan policy over the last two 
decades, picking up where Hearn left off by starting with what transpired during the 1992 HEA 
Reauthorization. The intent of this section is to highlight what particular federal actions were 
taken in relation to student loans and why, and to examine how these actions contributed to the 
growth in student loan borrowing and continue to shape current federal financial aid policies.  
1.4.1. 1990’s: Reauthorizations and Loan Reforms 
 
In the early 1990s, the financial aid system for postsecondary education in the United 
States was facing a myriad of issues that Congress wished to address with the upcoming 1992 
Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act (HEA).8 First, the formula determining the amount 
of money that families could be expected to contribute to the cost of a student’s education was 
confusing and complex. Students completed one form to apply for financial aid, but the 
information from the application created two separate Expected Family Contribution (EFC) 
amounts - one to be used for the Pell grant program and a second for other forms of federal aid 
(Fitzgerald, 2006). In an attempt to reduce the complexity of the application process, 
policymakers wanted to create a single EFC that could be used across all federal aid programs 
(Schenet, 1993).  
                                                
8 Throughout this paper, Higher Education Act and HEA will be used interchangeably.  
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Second, the annual cost of attendance (which includes tuition, fees, and room and board) 
was increasing at a rate that was outpacing inflation (Schenet, 1993). Need-based grants, such as 
the Pell grant, had failed to keep pace with rising tuition rates and were losing their purchasing 
power. This meant that the maximum award amount from the Pell grant was not providing 
enough resources for low-income students to attend moderately priced institutions. At the same 
time, parents were contributing less to their children’s college education than parents from the 
previous generation (Fossey, 1998) and, because of aid reforms under the Reagan administration, 
there was little federal financial assistance available for middle- and upper-income families 
(Hearn, 1998; Mumper, 1996). Policymakers needed to figure out a way to increase the 
purchasing power of the Pell grant and expand the eligibility of federal aid programs to middle-
income families. 
Third, because of the rising tuition rates and the inability of need-based grants to keep 
pace, students were borrowing more loans than they had in the two decades prior and were 
graduating with debt that some feared had become unmanageable. The cohort default rate 
reached an historic high of 22.4 percent in 1990 (see Figure 1.3). This meant that almost 1 in 4 
loans were going into default. The high default rates resulted in significant costs for the federal 
government; in 1991, $3.6 billion was spent to cover default claims (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 1995).  
Rather than blaming borrowers for the rising default rates, several reports by the U.S. 
General Accounting Office (1991, 1992)9 and the Permanent Senate Subcommittee on 
Investigations (1991) pointed to for-profit colleges and FFEL lenders as the source of the 
problem. These reports noted that borrowers were attending proprietary institutions that did not 
provide a quality education and argued that these institutions only existed to take advantage of 
                                                
9 Now known as the Government Accountability Office. 
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the “cash cow” provided to them by the federal government. Many of these students were 
leaving college with little or no training and accumulated loan debt that could not be repaid 
because they lacked the skills needed to obtain a job. There was also evidence that proprietary 
schools were recruiting low-income students who, for various reasons, were highly unlikely to 
ever complete their postsecondary degree. The reports also pointed out that FFEL lenders had 
little incentive to help borrowers repay their loans because the loan program posed little to no 
risk for lenders. Most notably, the federal government reimbursed lenders for defaulted loans.  
The aforementioned issues surrounding student loans made the program costly for the 
federal government, and it became evident that the whole loan program was in shambles. Senator 
Edward Kennedy argued that “the student loan program may be just one step ahead of disaster” 
(cited in Mumper, 1996, p. 100). The Permanent Senate Subcommittee on Investigations (1991) 
was more direct: they noted that the loan program was “plagued by fraud and abuse at every 
level and lacking meaningful oversight and management controls, the program has become 
inefficient, ineffective, and far too costly” (p. 33).  
1.4.1.1. 1992 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act 
 
 Addressing all the issues described above in one broad piece of legislation would be a 
difficult task, given the political climate at the time. Politicians had the desire to expand 
eligibility and increase the benefits of federal aid programs, yet Presidential and congressional 
elections were approaching, and President George H. W. Bush was determined to cut back on 
federal spending (Mumper, 1996). This meant a possible Presidential veto loomed over any 
effort to increase the scope of financial aid, and the threat of a veto influenced the issues that 
would be addressed in the final bill. For example, because of this political climate, one important 
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proposal – to make the Pell grant program an entitlement and increase the maximum award 
amount – was abandoned.   
 In spite of the limitations necessitated by the political climate, the passage of the 1992 
Reauthorization ushered in the largest reform in federal financial aid since the 1970s (Mumper, 
1996). While the bill did not constitute the reform that many individuals felt was needed, it did 
provide a significant framework for financial aid that is still used today. The provisions within 
the bill altered the calculation used to determine students’ financial need, provided aid access to 
middle-income families, introduced new flexible student loan repayment options, and created 
more government oversight of for-profit institutions. 
In order to simplify and improve the process of determining aid eligibility, 
Reauthorization developed a single method for calculating students’ financial need, and created a 
new application – still in use today – known as the Free Application for Federal Student Aid 
(FAFSA) (Fitzgerald, 2006). The new aid application and formula no longer considered home 
and family farm equities as available assets and ignored all financial assets for families with 
income below $50,000 and receiving means-tested federal benefits. Compared to the old need 
analysis formula, the new formula expanded eligibility for federal aid programs, particularly 
loans.  
Reauthorization also addressed the concerns of middle-income families hit particularly 
hard by the rising cost of college attendance. Middle-income students benefited from the creation 
of the Stafford unsubsidized loan program, which provided federal loan access to all students 
regardless of their families’ financial need or income. Additionally, the annual loan limits under 
the Stafford loan program increased for second-year undergraduates from $2,625 to $3,500, and 
the maximum for upper division undergraduates increased from $4,000 to $5,500 (see Table 
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1.1). The aggregate loan amount limit increased from $17,250 to $23,000 for dependent students, 
and $37,250 to $46,000 for independent students. Parents benefited from the changes to the 
PLUS loan program that allowed them to borrow larger loan amounts. Prior to 1992, the amount 
of money parents could borrow through the PLUS loan program was capped at $4,000. 
Reauthorization eliminated this cap and allowed parent to receive a PLUS loan up to the cost of 
attendance minus any aid the student received.  
In an attempt to curb the high default rate, the 1992 Reauthorization introduced new debt 
relief and flexible repayment options for borrowers. One provision, for example, encouraged the 
Department of Education (ED) to work with employers from the public and private sectors to 
provide options that would help borrowers repay federal loans. Suggested mechanisms included 
payroll deductions for loan payments and loan repayment matching provisions as part of 
employee benefit packages. The bill also required lenders to provide borrowers with graduated or 
income sensitive repayment options. Graduated repayment grants borrowers a month payment 
amount that increases over time – the borrower makes small payments first and then larger 
payments later. This repayment option is structured on the assumption that borrowers’ income 
will increase over the repayment period. Similarly, income sensitive repayment provides 
borrowers with a monthly payment amount that is annually adjusted to their income. The 
Reauthorization bill also increased the amount of time an unemployed borrower can defer 
payments from 2 years to 3, and made a new loan deferment available to borrowers who were 
facing “economic hardship.” Borrowers could defer payments while receiving public assistance 
or working full-time with a monthly income 150% below the federal poverty line.  
To halt future abuse and fraud from proprietary institutions, the Reauthorization 
amendments enacted new accountability and oversight provisions. One provision was the “85/15 
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rule” (Skinner, 2007), which stipulated that for-profit college could not derive more than 85 
percent of their total revenue from federal aid programs. In addition, because many of the for-
profit colleges offered courses through telecommunications or correspondence, a new provision 
called the “50% rule” was created. Under this provision, an institution loses federal aid funding 
if more than 50 percent of the institution’s courses are offered through telecommunications or 
correspondence. 
 Although not fully implemented by the final bill, the debate and discussion surrounding 
the 1992 Reauthorization introduced an idea that would play a key role in future financial aid 
policy: the move to end FFEL and lender participation in the federal Stafford loan programs, and 
direct all federal student loans through the federal government. Under this new plan, known as 
direct lending, student loans are financed entirely with federal capital and are provided directly 
to students. Supporters of the program argued that removing private lenders, guarantee agencies, 
and secondary markets would save taxpayers billions of dollars. The direct loan program would 
also simplify loan delivery and free institutions from having to deal with multiple lenders. 
Opponents of direct lending questioned the estimated cost savings and suggested that the current 
FFEL program had already proven its effectiveness over time. They argued that the move to a 
new system would be nothing more than an untested experiment at the taxpayers’ expense 
(Mumper, 1996). 
As support for a full-scale move to direct lending was gaining momentum, particularly 
among Democrats, Education Secretary Lamar Alexander announced he was opposed to direct 
lending, and President Bush threatened to veto the Reauthorization bill if such a program was 
created (Mumper, 1996). As a compromise, the direct loan program was codified as a 
demonstration project that allowed no more than 300 institutions to participate.   
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1.4.1.2. President Clinton and the Move to Direct Lending 
 
 When Bill Clinton began his presidential term in 1993, he proposed a streamlined loan 
program with a national service component to replace existing federal loan programs (Mumper, 
1996). Clinton believed that many college graduates were avoiding public service jobs because 
they incurred too much student loan debt (Waldman, 1995), and he suggested a new loan 
program consisting of income contingent loans. Under this proposal, borrowers’ monthly 
payments would be based on their income and, after a certain period of time, the remaining loan 
balance would be forgiven in exchange for public service. The overall idea was to reform student 
loans into a streamlined system – one loan program with a flexible repayment option. Cost 
estimates of Clinton’s new student loan program were high, upwards of eight billion dollars a 
year (Waldman, 1995). The anticipated costs forced Clinton to scale back his national service 
proposal. The final version of his plan created the AmeriCorps program, which, at its inception, 
provided participants up to $4,750 to repay student loans in exchange for a year of service; the 
program was limited to no more than 100,000 people (Hearn, 1998; Waldman, 1995). 
President Clinton’s desire to streamline the student loan system provided momentum for 
the implementation of the Direct Loan program proposed during the 1992 Reauthorization. 
Clinton embraced the program’s projected financial savings and wanted to tie direct loans to an 
income-contingent repayment option (Waldman, 1995). This type of repayment option would 
determine borrowers’ monthly payment amount—adjusted annually—based on outstanding loan 
balance, adjusted gross income, and family size. Borrowers would also have their loans 
discharged (or forgiven) after a 25-year repayment period.  
While President Clinton and House Democrats favored a full-scale and immediate 
implementation of direct lending, Democrats in the Senate, namely Senators Claiborne Pell and 
20 
 
Edward Kennedy, proposed that the program be gradually phased-in in order to assess the 
program’s effectiveness (Cervantes et al., 2005; Waldman, 1995). Ultimately, direct lending and 
income contingent repayment were approved through the passage of the Student Loan Reform 
Act of 1993 with a gradual phase-in. The new loan program was called the William D. Ford 
Direct Loan Program and the transition to direct lending was to occur over a 5-year period: direct 
lending would comprise 5 percent of federal loans in 1994-95, 40 percent in 1995-96, 50 percent 
in 1996-97, and 60 percent in 1997-98 and 1998-99. In contrast to the legislative intent, direct 
lending’s share of the loan market only peaked to a high of 34 percent in fiscal year 1997 
(Cervantes et al., 2005). Postsecondary institutions were hesitant to make the move to direct 
lending for fear that the program was not fully tested; they wanted to give the federal 
government time to work out any initial problems. Because of this hesitation, the phase-in 
provisions were later repealed and institutions continued to have the choice of participating in 
either the Direct Loan program or the Federal Family Education Loan program.   
1.4.1.3. 1998 Reauthorization of the HEA 
 
Leading up to the Reauthorization of 1998, the general sentiment in Washington was that 
no new financial aid initiatives needed to be included in the reauthorization. Reforms from the 
1992 Reauthorization and additional legislation in the interim had addressed the problems 
plaguing the federal aid system and the outlook was much more positive. The cohort default rate 
was on the decline; from 1994 to 1998, the cohort default rate decreased from 10.7 percent to 6.9 
percent. The default decline was not only attributed to the loan reforms that occurred over the 
1990s, but also to the Department of Education taking a more proactive role in overseeing the 
federal loan program. ED took an aggressive approach to seizing loan defaulter’s federal income 
tax refund and denied new loans to borrowers with an existing loan in default status (Fossey, 
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1998). Perhaps most important was a rule created in the late 1980s, wherein the ED targeted 
postsecondary institutions with a high default rate and sanctioned them from participating in 
federal aid programs, such as the Pell grant.   
Additionally, President Clinton had recently signed the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, 
which allowed student loan borrowers to take a tax deduction on their student loan interest and 
introduced two education tax credits – the Hope Scholarship and the Lifetime Learning Tax 
Credit. While the creation of these tax credits aligned with the intent of the HEA to provide 
students and families with financial assistance, the tax credits only benefited middle- and high-
income families with taxable income (annual incomes greater than $50,000) (Long, 2004).  
Thus, unlike in 1992, the 1998 Reauthorization of the HEA did not legislate any 
significant reforms to the financial aid system. Instead, it made small alterations to address 
lingering issues, including changes to aspects of student loan repayment (Cervantes et al., 
2005).10 First, the amendments extended the period of nonpayment before a borrower is declared 
to be in default from 180 days to 270 days. Second, Reauthorization prohibited the discharge of 
students’ federal student loans through bankruptcy. Prior to Reauthorization, student loans could 
be discharged through bankruptcy if the borrower was at least seven years into repayment. The 
1998 Reauthorization eliminated this seven-year ban and permanently excluded federal student 
loans from being considered in bankruptcy claims. Finally, Reauthorization created a loan 
forgiveness program that allowed teachers to have $5,000 of their Stafford loans forgiven after 
five years of teaching in a low-income school.   
In addition to changes related to loan repayment, the 1998 Reauthorization loosened the 
requirements for proprietary schools to participate in federal financial aid programs. As 
                                                
10 The bill did increase the authorized Pell maximum, but future federal appropriations would set the Pell maximum 
below these authorized levels.  
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mentioned previously, the 1992 Reauthorization created a new provision stipulating that for-
profit institutions could not derive more than 85 percent of their revenue from federal funds. One 
of the main arguments against this provision was that it limits college access for low-income 
students; in order to meet the required percentage of students not receiving federal financial aid, 
for-profit institutions would have to either deny admission to such students or require them to 
pay the full cost of tuition out of pocket, rendering enrollment impossible (Skinner, 2007). 
Reauthorization changed the “85/15 rule” to become the “90/10 rule,” meaning that proprietary 
institutions could not derive over 90 percent of their revenue from federal funding. 
  The last set of Reauthorization amendments included changes to student loan interest 
rates. The amendments reduced the interest rate on Stafford loans by 0.8 percentage points and 
made the interest rate on consolidated loans equal to the weighted average interest rate of all the 
loans being consolidated. In contrast to Stafford loans, consolidated loans bear a fixed interest 
rate. During periods when variable interest rates are low, consolidation gives borrowers an 
opportunity to lock in at a low interest rate for up to 30 years of repayment. As I discuss later in 
the paper, these changes to interest rates and consolidation will significantly influence loan 
policy throughout the 2000s. 
Though the changes in financial aid policy throughout the 1990s rescued an inefficient 
system, they did little to provide lower-income students with more resources to pay for college. 
Rather, the expansion of aid programs during the period was geared toward middle- and upper-
income students through the introduction of unsubsidized loans, the alteration of the need 
analysis formula, and the introduction of education tax credits. While this expansion appeared to 
provide much-needed aid to help students cope with rising tuition prices, the majority of the aid 
took the form of loans. Changes to existing loan programs and the introduction of new programs 
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generated opportunities for students to take on additional debt (Mumper, 1996). By essentially 
equating access to college with access to loans, the policy changes reduced the role of taxpayer 
support and began shifting the burden of paying for college squarely onto the shoulders of 
students and families (St. John, 2006).  
1.4.2. 2000 - 2007: Reaction to Loopholes and Scandals, and Mini-Reauthorizations 
 
 There was no comprehensive Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act between 2000 
and 2007. Instead, financial aid and higher education policy took a back burner to other national 
issues, as the nation was recovering from the recession in 2001 and President George W. Bush 
and Congress were occupied with the after-effects of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. 
National security and two wars on terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq dominated both the public 
discourse and the policy agendas of the major political parties. Additionally, the government had 
to deal with the destruction from Hurricane Katrina in the Gulf Coast, and orchestrate foreign 
relief for the Indian Ocean Tsunami. Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act typically 
happens every 4 to 6 years and since the last reauthorization of the HEA occurred in 1998, it was 
set to expire in 2003. 
Because the aforementioned issues took precedence, Congress postponed a 
comprehensive reauthorization by continually passing legislation that extended the HEA’s 
statutory provisions. During this time, higher education legislation pertained to a particular issue 
or implemented certain budgetary priorities (Madzelan, 2014). Two such pieces of legislation, 
the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) and the College Cost Reduction Act of 2007 (CCRA), 
were considered “mini-reauthorizations” because they established the most significant reforms to 
financial aid and student loans during this time period. In the sections that follow, I discuss the 
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financial aid issues leading up to the passage of DRA and CCRA and the policy changes enacted 
through other legislation before highlighting key provisions of both bills.  
1.4.2.1. Student Loan Loopholes  
 
From 2002-03 to 2005-06, the interest rate on federal student loans reached historic lows 
(see Figure 1.1). Borrowers already in repayment on variable interest rate loans were 
consolidating their loans to take advantage of the low fixed interest rate, especially before 2006 
when the variable interest rate was scheduled to increase 2 percentage points. In addition, due to 
legislation passed in 2001, the interest rate for students currently enrolled in school was set to 
change from variable to a fixed 6.8 percent on July 1, 2006 (Delisle, 2012). While consolidation 
was developed to help borrowers in repayment, a loophole in the Higher Education Act made it 
possible for students to consolidate their loans while enrolled in school. Enrolled students could 
notify their lenders of their wish to enter early repayment, consolidate their loans, and then 
request an in-school deferment.11  
The upcoming increase in interest rates, combined with the in-school consolidation 
loophole, resulted in an explosion in the number of loan consolidations, especially in the FFEL 
program. As Figure 1.4 illustrates, the FFEL consolidation volume grew over 600 percent, from 
$9.4 billion in 2001 fiscal year to $72 billion in 2006. The U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (2004) estimated that the federal government was spending over $1 billion each year in 
subsidies to lenders to help with loan consolidations. To reduce consolidation costs, the in-school 
consolidation loophole was eliminated in 2005. After 2007, interest rates increased (see Figure 
1.1) and changed from variable to fixed, which made consolidation less attractive to students and 
accounted for the significant decline in new consolidation volume depicted in Figure 1.4. 
                                                
11 This loophole was applicable for FFEL loans. Students at Direct loan schools could consolidate their loans while 
enrolled and in repayment.  
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 Figure 1.4. New Consolidation Loan Volume 
 
Notes: Amounts are in current dollars.  
Source: U.S. Department of Education (2008b, 2009c, 2010a, 2011e, 2012, 2013, 2014d) 
 
 
 
Congress responded to the rise in consolidation by eliminating what was known as the 
“single-holder rule” in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2006. Under this 
rule, if a borrower had loans with a single lender, the borrower could only consolidate with that 
lender. This provision limited students’ ability to shop for the best terms and services for 
consolidation loans. By eliminating this rule, borrowers have the freedom to explore options and 
choose loan terms that work best for them.    
In addition to the in-school consolidation loophole, FFEL lenders took advantage of 
another loophole allowing them to profit from tax-exempt bonds. In the early 1970s, to ensure 
loan availability and encourage lender participation, the federal government offered banks a 
guaranteed rate of return (called a lender yield) for loans provided to students (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004). When borrowers’ interest rates are less than the lender’s rate of 
return, the federal government pays lenders the difference via “special allowance payments.” To 
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finance loans in the 1970s, the federal government allowed state-designated authorities to sell 
tax-exempt bonds and use the proceeds to make loans with a minimum lender yield of 9.5 
percent (Kvaal & Shireman, 2004). In 1993, the 9.5 percent lender yield minimum was 
eliminated. However, any loans financed with proceeds from the tax-exempt bonds prior to 1993 
were still guaranteed a minimum 9.5 percent rate of return. By 2004, it was discovered that the 
federal government was still paying FFEL lenders who were issuing loans financed with pre-
1993 tax-exempt bonds. Because the borrower interest rates were extremely low compared to the 
9.5 percent guaranteed return, the special allowance payments to FFEL lenders increased 
dramatically from $209 million in 2001 to over $634 million in 2004 (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004). Discovering that lenders continued to take advantage of this 
loophole at a large cost to taxpayers, Congress passed the Taxpayer-Teacher Protection Act of 
2004 and eliminated the 9.5 percent lender yield for all loans financed from tax-exempt bonds, 
regardless of when the proceeds were generated. Using the money saved from this provision, 
Congress supplemented the 1998 teacher loan forgiveness program by raising the forgiveness 
amount to $17,500 for individuals teaching for 5 consecutive years in mathematics, science, or 
special education.  
1.4.2.2. Student Loan Lender Scandals 
 
Following the recession in 2001, college enrollment rates grew and state funding for 
higher education declined (Tandberg, 2010; Toutkoushian & Shafiq, 2010). To generate 
additional revenue, an increasing number of colleges began to engage in a practice called “school 
as lender.” Colleges would obtain a line of credit from a bank or use their own capital to provide 
student loans to graduate students. The college would then sell its loan portfolio to lenders and 
use the revenue to create need-based financial aid for undergraduate students. According to a 
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GAO (2005) report, the value of loans originated by school lenders grew from $535 million in 
1999-00 to over $1.5 billion in 2003-04.  
The GAO report noted several concerns with colleges acting as lenders. First, since 
colleges determine both cost of attendance and students’ eligibility for student loans, a conflict of 
interest arises because the colleges making loans financially benefit from increases in tuition 
rates and the resulting student debt. Second, the report questioned the schools’ contractual 
relationships with lenders and whether these relationships created an incentive for the school to 
encourage student borrowing. The bargaining practices between colleges and lenders potentially 
violated an HEA provision called the “anti-inducement provision.” This provision prohibits “any 
lender from offering gifts or other incentives to schools or individuals to secure FFEL 
applicants” (GAO, 2005, p. 5). At the time, the Department of Education was not actively 
enforcing this provision. In a 2003 memo, the Department of Education’s Office of Inspector 
General stated that guidance on inducements and gifts were outdated and urged the Department 
to issue new guidelines to clarify what constitutes an inducement. Though the Department of 
Education did not take any action in response to the memo, Congress eliminated the ability for 
colleges to act as a lender in 2005.  
Abolishing the school as lender practice did not quell all concerns about the relationships 
between lenders and colleges. In 2006, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo announced 
he would begin an investigation into the lending practices of the student loan industry. At the 
conclusion of his investigation in 2007, Cuomo revealed numerous scandals in which student 
loan lenders were providing financial compensation to schools with the expectation that the 
lender will be placed on the college’s “preferred lender” list (New York State Office of the 
Attorney General, 2007). It was also discovered that lenders were giving financial aid 
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administrators all-expenses-paid trips to high-end resorts and paid positions on advisory boards. 
In June 2007, the U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) 
released a report from its own investigation into the marketing practices of student loan lenders. 
The report confirmed the findings of Cuomo’s investigation and uncovered instances in which 
financial aid administrators held stock options in lenders on their college’s preferred-lender list. 
Students and families often seek advice from financial aid offices when choosing among 
an array of options to finance a college degree. Ideally, colleges would provide unbiased 
guidance based on the best interest of the student. The findings from the investigations suggested 
that close relationships and corrupt practices between lenders and schools were discouraging 
students and their families from seeking out financial solutions most appropriate and beneficial 
for their situations. In response to the scandals, Congress passed the Student Loan Sunshine Act 
in 2008 to create more government oversight and guidelines regarding inducements and the 
relationships between lenders and colleges.  
1.4.2.3. Growth in Private Education Loans  
 
Another big concern for policymakers and the higher education community in the mid-
2000s was the rapid increase in undergraduates borrowing educational loans from private 
lenders, which typically carry higher interest rates and less flexible repayment options compared 
to federal loans. In 2006, McSwain et al. (2006)  found that an overwhelming majority of private 
loans – 83 percent – were borrowed by undergraduates. For the 2007-08 academic year, after 
adjusting for inflation, federal loan volume for undergraduates was slightly more than $49 
billion, and private loan volume was $22 billion (College Board, 2014b). However, comparing 
the growth rates of student loans from 2002-03 to 2007-08, federal loans grew 30 percent, 
whereas private loans increased by 187 percent.  
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A key factor that led to students’ growing use of private loans was the gap between 
increasing college tuition rates and low federal loan limits; the discrepancy forced low-income 
students to seek out other funding sources to cover the remaining cost of their education. Private 
loans served as a viable mechanism to pay for college in a way that federal aid alone could not. 
Indeed, studies found private and federal student loan borrowing were connected: undergraduates 
were borrowing private loans when they had already maxed out their Stafford loan eligibility 
(King, 2007; Rube, 2003; Wegmann, Cunningham, & Merisotis, 2003). Further, in 2007, 
findings from focus groups and qualitative interviews conducted by Consumers Union revealed 
that a majority of students and parents did not know the difference between federal and private 
student loans and thought the interest rates for the two loan types were the same (Consumers 
Union, 2007).  
 Despite the concerns associated with the trends in private loans, Congress did little to 
address the issue. Instead, Congress disadvantaged borrowers by passing legislation that made it 
more difficult to discharge private student loans. In 2005, President Bush signed the Bankruptcy 
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Act (BAPCA). While the intent of this legislation was to 
tighten the bankruptcy eligibility requirements and reduce bankruptcy fraud, language in the bill 
added private educational loans to the category of debt that could not be discharged (Ang & 
Jimenez, 2014). The 1998 Reauthorization made federal loans non-dischargeable, but BAPCA 
added private loans to the list. As a consequence, student loans, both private and federal, cannot 
be declared in bankruptcy courts. 
1.4.2.4. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 
 
 In 2005, Congress was finally preparing for a comprehensive reauthorization of the HEA. 
Consideration of the reauthorization bill was delayed, however, because of Congressional desire 
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to reduce federal spending by $35 billion over the next five years. In order to reauthorize the 
HEA and to achieve targeted spending cuts, congressional leaders suggested that HEA 
reauthorization should be divided into two parts. The first part, to be directed through the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 2005, would reauthorize and address HEA provisions that could save taxpayer 
dollars. The remaining provisions would be reauthorized through a bill titled the College Access 
and Opportunity Act (CAOA). The House passed the CAOA, but the Senate never brought the 
bill to a vote, squashing the hope of fully reauthorizing the HEA through two separate bills. 
Instead, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) focused solely on issues that could generate 
savings. In addition to closing the in-school consolidation and school as lender loopholes 
discussed above, the DRA made significant changes to components of the federal student loan 
programs.   
 Of the $35 billion to be cut in federal spending, changes to student loan programs would 
account for the largest portion of the savings, roughly $12 billion (Congressional Budget Office, 
2006). Congress was able to make significant cuts from the student loan programs because of 
their desire to preserve the legislation from 2001 that locked Stafford interest rates (mentioned 
above) (Best & Best, 2014). With the downturn in the economy in the early 2000s, no one was 
able to project that the variable interest rate would fall to historic lows (see Figure 1.1). The low 
interest rates would be costly when considering the subsidies the federal government provides to 
FFEL lenders (Morris & McGann, 2007). As mentioned earlier, when the interest rate is lower 
than the lender rate of return, the federal government provides lenders with the difference. In 
order to reduce government spending, Congress decided to increase the student loan interest rate 
and generate savings from the reduction in lender subsidies. Congress maintained the 2001 
legislation with a fixed-interest rate at 6.8 percent for Stafford loans, 7.9 percent for Direct PLUS 
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loans, and 8.5 percent for FFEL PLUS loans. 
While the interest rate provisions were less favorable to borrowers, the DRA did enact 
changes that benefited students. There was a reduction in student loan fees and, for the first time 
since the 1992 Reauthorization, the DRA increased the Stafford annual loan limits for 
undergraduates by as much as $1,000 (see loan limits from July 2007 to June 2008 in Table 1.1). 
The aggregate limit remained at $23,000 for dependent students and $46,000 for independents. 
Additionally, graduate students became eligible to borrow under the PLUS loan program.  
The DRA created two new grant programs: the Academic Competitiveness Grant (ACG) 
and the National Science and Mathematics to Retain Talent (SMART). The ACG is restricted to 
Pell recipients who completed a “rigorous secondary program” and were in their first- or second-
year of college enrollment.12 Eligible students could receive up to $750 in the first year and up to 
$1,300 in the second year. The SMART provided $4,000 to third- and fourth-year students in the 
Science, Technology, Mathematics, and Engineering (STEM) fields. These two programs, 
however, were short lived. Reports from the U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009) and 
U.S. Department of Education (2011b) noted that the programs’ eligibility requirements made it 
hard for students to qualify, resulting in lower participation rates than expected. Ultimately, 
Congress ended funding for both of these programs in 2010.   
1.4.2.5.  College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 
 
 For the upcoming 2008 budget, like DRA, Congress went through a reconciliation 
process and tasked respective education committees in the House and Senate to reduce spending 
by $750 million (Stoll, Smole, & Mercer, 2007). The process was different this time because 
Democrats had gained a majority in both chambers during the 2006 mid-term elections. The new 
                                                
12 The ED Secretary defines “rigorous secondary program”. Visit https://www2.ed.gov/admins/finaid/about/ac-
smart/state-programs.html for a list of secondary programs that qualify.  
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leadership was eager to tackle financial aid issues that were not addressed in bills passed by the 
Republican-controlled Congress. While acknowledging the need to meet the reconciliation 
directives, Democrats wanted to do so without placing the burden on borrowers. The resulting 
bill, the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (CCRA), reduced federal spending by 
changing the formula used to calculate federal subsidies to FFEL lenders. With the projected 
savings from the formula change, the CCRA reduced interest rates on subsidized Stafford loans, 
created three new loan repayment options, increased the Pell grant maximum, and established 
College Access Challenge Grants, the last of which allocated funding to states and non-profit 
organizations to provide grant aid to students and support higher education outreach programs. 
 The first area of student aid reform in the CCRA revised the fixed interest rates on 
Stafford loans established by the DRA. The interest rate, originally fixed at 6.8 percent, was to 
gradually decline to 3.5 percent for subsidized Stafford loans. The interest rate for unsubsidized 
loans remained fixed at 6.8 percent (Stoll et al., 2007) (see Figure 1.1). 
The second area of reform, comprising a large portion of the CCRA, was the creation of 
three new loan related repayment options. The first, a new income-based repayment plan, started 
in 2009. Under this new plan borrowers have 25 years to repay, and monthly loan payments are 
capped at 15 percent of discretionary income—calculated as the difference between adjusted 
gross income and 150 percent of the federal poverty line. The second new repayment option is a 
loan forgiveness plan that relieves students’ debt in exchange for employment in public sector or 
non-profit jobs. The CCRA also established a conditional grant/loan program called the Teacher 
Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH). This aid program provides up 
to $4,000 annually in grants to students who intend to teach full-time at a low-income school 
after graduation. If the student does not fulfill the teaching obligations, the grant converts to an 
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unsubsidized Stafford loan (Stoll et al., 2007).13  
The third student aid reform involved changes to the Pell grant. Between 2003-04 and 
2006-07, Congress consistently funded the Pell grant up to a maximum of $4,050. For 2007-08, 
the Pell maximum was $4,310. The CCRA increased the Pell maximum by changing Pell’s 
funding structure. Starting in 2008, the Pell grant would include a $490 mandatory add-on to the 
maximum amount appropriated by Congress. The supplemental amount would increase to $690 
in 2010 and to $1,090 in 2012. Though the $1,090 add-on was reduced through legislation in 
2010. Additionally, the CCRA changed the EFC formula to expand eligibility for the Pell grant 
by increasing the income threshold and automatically setting the EFC to zero for dislocated 
workers.  
Looking back over the early to mid 2000s, federal financial aid policy during the period 
was generally reactive in nature. Congress’ response to financial aid issues was limited to 
correcting specific problems as they arose. In most instances, these perceived problems involved 
the student loan industry. Every time there was interest in a comprehensive reauthorization of the 
Higher Education Act, external pressures—specifically budget reconciliation—seemed to derail 
efforts. In essence, the inability of the federal government to enact financial aid policies to 
improve college affordability pushed an increasing number of students and their families to 
finance their post-secondary education with loans. Congress did create two new grant programs, 
ACG and SMART, but these programs were directed toward academically high-achieving 
students and did little to benefit the majority of low-income students (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2009). It was not until 2007 that Congress acted to help the majority of 
undergraduates by increasing the Pell maximum and introducing new loan repayment options.  
                                                
13 A discussion on the differences between loan forgiveness and conditional grant/loan programs is provided in 
Appendix 1.D.  
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1.4.3. 2008 - Present: Economic Collapse, Loan Reform, and Debt 
 
 The most recent era in student loan policy occurred during a period in which the United 
States faced the biggest economic crisis since the Great Depression. Congress reauthorized the 
HEA, but legislative changes on loan policy were direct responses to economic conditions. 
Losses from subprime mortgages and other risky investments reduced the amount of money 
banks had available to lend, for example, so the federal government provided lenders with the 
financial capital to continue offering loans to students. In addition, economic conditions left a 
growing number of students unable to repay their education loans. Many college graduates were 
struggling to find employment and an increasing share were forced to take part-time jobs 
(Hobijn, Gardiner, & Wiles, 2011). For those that could find jobs, the wages for young college 
graduates were roughly 5.4 percent lower than in 2000 (Shierholz, Sabadish, & Wething, 2012). 
In spite of the poor repayment prospects, student loan debt climbed from $200 million in 2003 to 
over $1 trillion in 2010, as Figure 1.5 illustrates, and became the second largest form of debt 
behind home mortgages. In response to the emerging discourse among policymakers, the media, 
and the public that characterized student loan debt as a problem of national concern, 
Congressional leaders and newly elected President Obama pushed for new student loan 
repayment options and more federal oversight of colleges from which students graduate with 
high debt loads. 
1.4.3.1. Congressional Response to the Market Crisis and Students Loans 
 
Congress’ first response to the growing market crisis and higher education was to ensure 
that students had access to loans to facilitate college attendance. With the arrival of the Great 
Recession in 2008, FFEL lenders faced a dilemma: Wall Street investors were wary of buying 
asset-backed securities, and many lenders participating in the FFEL program relied on sales of  
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Figure 1.5. Outstanding Total Debt in the United States 
 
Notes: Graph excludes home mortage debt. Amounts are in current dollars. The Other 
debt category includes personal and retail loans.  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2015) 
 
 
 
those securities to finance student loans. Because of the market crisis and the subsidy reductions 
enacted by the CCRA, lenders were threatening to stop participating in the FFEL program 
altogether. Some lenders ceased making loans at particular institutions that had higher than 
average default rates. As nearly 75 percent of all federal loans were offered through the FFEL 
program (Congressional Budget Office, 2010), a mass exodus of lenders would leave a large 
numbers of students without loan access (Smole, 2008).  
In response, Congress passed and President Bush signed the Ensuring Continued Access 
to Student Loans Act of 2008 (ECASLA). This legislation allowed the Department of Education 
to purchase loan volume from lenders; the money from the purchases would then provide lenders 
the capital to continue making loans. In total, ED purchased nearly $151 billion in loan volume 
from FFEL lenders (U.S. Department of Education, 2011c).  
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 To ensure that students could borrow enough to finance their education, the ECASLA 
also increased Stafford loan limits (see Table 1.1). Effective July 1, 2008, the total annual loan 
limit increased $2,000 for both dependents and independents. With this change, the annual 
Stafford loans limits, for the first time, are greater than the annual subsidized limits for 
dependent students. ECASLA also increased the aggregate loan limit for dependents by $8,000, 
from $23,000 to $31,000. For independents, the aggregate limit increased $11,500, from $46,000 
to $57,500.   
For parents borrowing PLUS loans, the ECASLA provided repayment relief. Prior to the 
ECASLA, parental PLUS loans entered repayment within 60 days of disbursement. ECASLA 
amended the Higher Education Act to allow parent PLUS loan borrowers to defer repayment 
while their child was enrolled in school. 
1.4.3.2. 2008 Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act 
 
After the passage of the ECASLA, Congress revisited reauthorization of the HEA. The 
last comprehensive reauthorization occurred in 1998. Until 2008, Congress temporarily extended 
HEA provisions fourteen times (Smole, Kuenzi, & Skinner, 2008). In light of legislators’ 
preoccupation with the upcoming Congressional and Presidential elections and the recent 
reforms implemented by the CCRA and the ECASLA, this reauthorization would not be 
comprehensive. The reauthorization legislation, The Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008 
(HEOA), instead tackled technical amendments that had not been addressed since the 1992 and 
1998 Reauthorizations.  
 Specific to federal student loans, the HEOA increased annual and aggregate Perkins loan 
limits and created two new loan forgiveness programs (Smole et al., 2008). The first is designed 
to grant borrowers employed full-time in an area of national need receive up to $10,000 in loan 
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forgiveness. However, Congress has yet to fund this program (Hegji, Smole, & Heisler, 2014). 
The second forgiveness program provides up to $40,000 in loan forgiveness for civil legal 
assistance attorneys. Additionally, the HEOA altered the method used to determine cohort 
default rates. Previously, the default rate was based on the share of borrowers who defaulted 
within a 2-year repayment period. The HEOA extended the 2-year period to 3 years, as a result, 
default rates increased significantly (see Figure 1.3 for a comparison of the 2-year and 3-year 
default rates). 
 For the Pell grant, the HEOA increased the maximum authorized award amounts for the 
first time since the 1998 Reauthorization. The authorized maximum was set to gradually increase 
to $8,000 in 2014. Because funding has to be appropriated annually, the Pell maximum 
consistently fell below these authorized levels by as much as $2,500. One initiative that President 
Bush advocated for and included in the HEOA was the ability for students to receive a Pell grant 
year round (Delisle & Miller, 2015). Under this plan, a student could receive a Pell grant for the 
summer in addition to the regular academic year. Two years later, year-round Pell was 
eliminated in order to reduce the overall cost of the Pell grant program. 
1.4.3.3. The Move to Full Direct Lending 
 
When President Obama took office in 2009, he argued that federal Stafford loans would 
be better served under the Direct Loan program, as opposed to the FFEL program. The market 
crisis in 2008 and the threat of lenders’ withdrawing from the FFEL program illustrated the 
vulnerability inherent in relying on external lenders to make federal loans. Support for Obama’s 
plan grew when the Congressional Budget Office (2010) estimated that replacing the FFEL with 
direct lending would save the government $87 billion. In his State of the Union Address, 
President Obama urged Congress to pass a bill that “will finally end the unwarranted taxpayer 
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subsidies that go to banks for student loans.” Further, he advocated for student debt relief, 
stating, “Let's tell another 1 million students that when they graduate, their student loan 
payments will be limited to 10 percent of their income and all of their debt will be forgiven after 
20 years.”  
 On March 30, 2010, President Obama signed the Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act, which officially ended external lender participation in federal loan programs 
and required all future student loans to be processed though the Direct Loan program. The 
legislation also created a new loan repayment program, called Pay as You Earn, to be financed 
with savings generated by eliminating the FFEL. Pay as You Earn allows borrowers’ monthly 
payment to be adjusted for annual income and for debt to be forgiven after 20 years (Dortch, 
Smole, & Mahan, 2010). Additionally, the Pell grant also received an increase of $13 billion in 
mandatory spending. 
1.4.3.4. Interest Rate Changes  
 
 In 2013, the CCRA provisions that reduced subsidized Stafford loan interest rates to a 
fixed 3.4 percent were set to expire and rates were scheduled to revert back to 6.8 percent. 
Federal policymakers had different ideas as to how the rates should be determined. President 
Obama advocated for tying interest rates to Treasury securities (Field, 2013). Congressional 
Republicans also wanted interest rates determined by Treasury securities, but preferred rates one 
percentage point higher than the President’s proposal. Congressional Democrats, on the other 
hand, proposed freezing rates at 3.4 percent in order to buy time to craft a more permanent 
solution. In the end, all parties agreed to a compromise. The Bipartisan Student Loan Certainty 
Act of 2013 changed the interest rates on subsidized Stafford loans from fixed to a fixed-variable 
hybrid in which the interest rate is adjusted annually for new loans and is fixed for the life of the 
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loan (Gardner, 2013). While the 2013-14 interest rate did increase from 3.4 percent to 3.86 
percent, the outcome was more favorable for borrowers than the scheduled jump to 6.8 percent. 
1.4.3.5. Institutional Accountability with Student Loan Debt 
 
With student loan debt and default rates rising, the Obama administration began to 
propose new mechanisms in late 2010 and early 2011 to hold postsecondary institutions 
accountable. The proposed rules attempted to monitor the quality of college programs that 
prepare students for gainful employment and oversee former students’ level of loan debt (Smole, 
2011). One proposed rule measured students’ ability to repay loan debt. Other measures 
specified the allowable debt-to-earnings ratio. Under these proposed “gainful employment” rules, 
if a college’s program fails to pass at least one of these measures for three out of four years, the 
federal government could sanction the college from participation in federal aid programs. In 
general, these proposed rules were directed toward for-profit colleges with academic programs 
that do not lead to a postsecondary degree.  
 After the release of these proposed rules, the U.S. Department of Education received over 
90,000 comments (Smole, 2011) and for-profit institutions filed several lawsuits against the 
Department. In one ruling, a federal judge recognized the need for government oversight of 
students’ debt but declared that proposed threshold measures to determine federal sanctions were 
“arbitrary and capricious” ("Association of Private Colleges and Universities v. Arne Duncan," 
2012). In response to the court ruling, the U.S. Department of Education proposed a new set of 
gainful employment rules in 2014. Compared to the earlier proposals, the rules on repayment rate 
were removed, but measures on earnings-to-debt ratios remained. Within weeks of the release of 
the new proposal, for-profit institutions filed a lawsuit, which suggests that efforts to promote 
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institutional accountability by establishing aggressive federal oversight are likely to be ongoing 
and a lasting source of friction between the government and for-profit institutions. 
 From 2008 to 2014, the federal government took a more proactive approach in boosting 
federal financial aid programs. Though some provisions, including the year-round Pell Grant and 
various loan forgiveness programs, were either never implemented or eventually cut to save 
money, other reforms offer significant benefits to students. The elimination of the FFEL and 
transition to direct lending generated savings to finance interest rate reductions, Pell grant 
increases, and new repayment options and loan forgiveness programs to alleviate the burden of 
education debt payments. New institutional accountability mechanisms, though tentative and 
highly controversial, are designed to prevent students from taking on student loan debt that they 
likely will be unable to repay given their economic prospects after graduating or exiting the 
program.  
 Furthermore, there appears to be a growing acknowledgement within the public discourse 
and among policymakers that the historical tendency to equate college access with student loan 
access and the policies born out of that mindset have promoted a reliance on loans that is 
unsustainable and detrimental to both individual students and the economy as a whole. Though 
meaningful action has not yet been taken to reverse the trend, ideas are emerging in new 
proposals. President Obama, for example, has advocated for allowing students to attend 
community colleges tuition free. This approach, which Congress has yet to consider, has the 
potential to significantly reduce the use of student loans. Additionally, President Obama has 
proposed a new initiative, the “Student Aid Bill of Rights,” which calls for federal action to 
improve student loan servicing and create new programs to help borrowers manage their debt. 
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The details of this initiative have yet to be announced, but the intentions demonstrate that 
policymakers are taking steps to make college affordable and student loan debt manageable.  
1.5. Conclusion 
 
 Over the past two decades, college tuition has risen faster than inflation and the 
purchasing power of need-based grants has not been able to keep pace. In 2012-13, for example, 
the Pell grant covered 30 percent of the cost of attendance at public 4-year institutions and less 
than 15 percent at private 4-year institutions (College Board, 2014b). To finance the growing 
portion of college costs not covered by need-based grants and to compensate for stagnate middle-
class incomes, students and their families are taking out more loans and borrowing larger 
amounts. As a result, student loans account for over 50 percent of all federal aid provided to 
students. The annual share of students borrowing has increased from 26 percent in 1995-96 to 42 
percent in 2011-12. Currently, over two-thirds of students graduate from college with an average 
debt load greater than $28,000 (The Institute for College Access & Success, 2014b). At $1.12 
trillion, student loan debt is now the second largest form of debt behind home mortgages. 
Hearn’s 1998 paper examined the history of federal loan policies and explained how 
policy changes contributed to the growth of federal loans in the financial aid system. This paper 
picked up where Hearn left off, documenting how federal loan policies have continued to 
promote student loans as a dominant mechanism for paying college costs and describing how 
specific policy changes have contributed to escalating debt. 
Although the nature and intent of financial aid provisions since the early 1990s varied 
widely, their implementation perpetuated the shift away from grant aid and toward loans and 
sought to expand college access by allowing more students to borrow larger loans. Rather than 
examining why middle-income families were increasingly unable to pay for college and 
42 
 
addressing college affordability, for example, Congressional action during the 1990s expanded 
loan eligibility for middle-income students. Grant aid was funded at stagnant levels while new 
aid programs, such as tax credits, were created, and initiatives that expanded loan access 
allocated more resources to loan programs. Other salient policy changes included increases in 
annual and aggregate loan limits; today dependent students can graduate with almost $31,000 in 
federal student loan debt, and that figure surges to $57,500 for independent students. 
Furthermore, the legislative response in more recent years to escalating default rates and 
the overall student loan debt has focused on reforming repayment rather than reducing the 
reliance on loans. Congress introduced a plethora of new income-contingent repayment plans 
and loan forgiveness programs and supported loan consolidation. All of which extended 
borrowers’ repayment terms and provided additional relief for borrowers in the short-term. 
While these provisions may help students already in repayment, they fail to address the 
underlying source of the problem and prevent current and future college students from 
graduating with high debt loads and ending up in similar situations to borrowers currently in 
repayment.   
Recent initiatives proposed by President Obama do reflect the growing realization that 
increasing the availability and amount of loans is not a viable mechanism for expanding access 
to and affordability of postsecondary education, but no meaningful action has been taken thus 
far. Given the ways in which the federal policies highlighted in this paper shaped the existing 
financial aid system and the difficulty passing and implementing sweeping reforms encountered 
in the past, however, the nature of policymakers’ response to the current crisis will likely have 
lasting consequences for future students and their families. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Appendix 1.A. Who can Borrow a Stafford Loans? 
 
Any student, regardless of their financial circumstances, can receive a Stafford subsidized 
or unsubsidized loan. In order to receive a loan, students must first complete the Free 
Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA) - an application containing over 100 questions that 
collects information on earned income, assets, family size, and the number of family members 
attending college for the year. Once individuals complete and submit the application, the 
Department of Education uses the information to calculate the Expected Family Contribution 
(EFC), which is “a measure of how much the student and his or her family can be expected to 
contribute to the cost of the student’s education for the year” (U.S. Department of Education, 
2014a, p. AVG-37).  
The type of loan a student receives depends on their financial need. Need is defined as 
the difference between the student’s cost of attendance (COA) and expected family contribution 
(EFC) (Need = COA - EFC). Cost of attendance is a measure of the amount that students are 
charged by the institution. This includes tuition and fees, as well as room and board (if the 
student lives on campus) or rent (if the student lives off campus), books, and transportation. 
Financial aid administrators develop aid packages consisting of grants and scholarships that are 
tailored to reduce students’ need. Subsidized loans are last dollar and fill in the remaining need 
after the application of grants and scholarships. Unsubsidized are also last dollar, but are not 
given to the student based on remaining need.  
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Even when aid administrators offer loans to students, it does not mean students are 
obligated to take the full amount. Students have discretion on the loan amount they wish to 
borrow, so long as the amount does not exceed the loan amount offered by the financial aid 
administrator. An example can be illustrated with a 1st year student who has a COA of $10,000 
and an EFC of $2,000. The student’s financial need is $8,000. Assuming the student received 
federal, state, and institutional grants totaling $5,600, the remaining financial need is $2,400. 
This remaining amount of need could be covered with a subsidized loan totaling up to $2,400. 
Because eligibility for an unsubsidized loan is not determined by financial need, the student has 
the option to cover their EFC with this loan. In this case, the student has the opportunity to 
borrow up to the total loan amount of $4,400, with no more than $2,400 being subsidized.  
Appendix 1.B. Federal Loan Repayment Plans 
 
 After graduating from college, borrowers are provided with various loan repayment 
plans, which are standard, graduate, extended, income-contingent, income-based, Pay-As-You 
Earn, and income-sensitive. The standard and graduated plans allow borrowers to repay their 
loans in 10 years, but the monthly repayment amount varies. With standard repayment, 
borrowers will repay the loan in equal sizes every month. Under a graduate repayment plan, 
borrowers will start with lower monthly payments, which will gradually increase until the loan is 
paid off. Extended repayment is similar to standard and graduates, but borrowers have 25 years 
to fully repay the loan.  
 The remaining repayment plans offer more flexibility with regards to a borrower’s 
income. The income-contingent plan allows monthly payments to be adjusted annually based on 
borrowers’ adjusted gross income (AGI), family size, and the total amount of the loan. The 
income-based provides for monthly payments that are determined annually by taking 15 percent 
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of the difference between students’ AGI and the 150 percent of the poverty thresholds for the 
borrowers’ family size. Pay-As-You Earn is very similar to the income-based repayment, but the 
monthly payments are determined from 10 percent of the difference between AGI and poverty 
thresholds. All of the aforementioned plans with income adjusted repayments offer loan 
forgiveness at the end of the repayment period, which can be equal to or greater than 20 years. 
For example, if a student using the income-based repayment plan and was not apply to fully 
repay the loan after 25 years, the outstanding loan balance will be forgiven. The last repayment 
plan, income-sensitive, is for FFEL loans only and does not offer loan forgiveness. The monthly 
payment for income-sensitive is annually adjusted and based on the borrower’s income.  
 As Table 1.5 displays, roughly 40 percent of outstanding Safford loans are being repaid 
under the standard plan. The second most popular repayment plan is income-based at 22 percent. 
In general, Table 1.5 illustrates that a majority of outstanding loans fall into plans that have set 
monthly payment, as opposed to a monthly payment that is income adjusted.  
 
Table 1.5. Repayment Plans for Outstanding Stafford Loans 
Repayment Plan 
Share of Federal Loan Volume 
in Repayment 
Standard: 10 years or less 39.8% 
Extended: More than 10 years 12.3% 
Graduated: 10 years or less 10.6% 
Graduated-Extended: More than 10 years 2.0% 
Income-Contingent 3.5% 
Income-Sensitive 0.0% 
Income-Based 22.0% 
Pay As You Earn 2.8% 
Alternative 1.1% 
Other 5.9% 
Note: Total outstanding federal loan volume was $597.2 billion as of December 31, 2014. Loan volume includes 
loans in repayment, deferment, and forbearance and excludes borrowers in default, in school, and grace. 
Source: (U.S. Department of Education, 2014c) 
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Borrowers also have the opportunity to have their debt relieved through a variety of 
federal and state aid programs that forgive loans in exchange for work in occupations that are 
considered to be in high demand. In an examination of state loan forgiveness programs, 
Kirshstein, Berger, Benatar, and Rhodes (2004) and Wiederspan (2011) both found that a 
majority of these programs are targeted to borrowers going into teaching, nursing, and medical 
occupations. At the federal level, there are several loan forgiveness programs and a conditional 
grant/loan for teachers and individuals working in the public sector. A discussion on the 
difference between loan forgiveness and conditional grant/loan programs is in Appendix 1.D. 
Appendix 1.C. Federal Support for Financial Aid 
 
 
Table 1.6. Description of Federal Aid Programs 
Pell Grants Formerly known as the Beginning Education Opportunity Grant (BEOG) and is 
the largest need-based aid program in the United States. Currently, students can 
receive a grant amount up to $5,550. The amount of the award depends upon 
EFC and enrollment intensity. 
Supplemental Education 
Opportunity Grant (SEOG) 
SEOG is a campus-based aid program. Colleges match federal funds. Not all 
college participates. Provided to students with extremely high financial need, 
with amounts up to $4,000. 
Leveraging Educational 
Assistance Partnership (LEAP) 
Previously known as the State Student Incentive Grant (SSIG). Program ended in 
2011-12. LEAP provided grants to states to create need-based grants. States 
determined eligibility and award amounts. 
Academic Competitiveness 
Grants (ACG) 
Started in 2006-07 and ended in 2011-12. Awarded to Pell Grant eligible students 
in their 1st and 2nd year of college enrollment and completed a rigorous high 
school program. Student could have received a grant amount up to $1,300. 
SMART Started in 2006-07 and ended in 2011-12. Awarded to Pell Grant eligible students 
in their 3rd and 4th year of college enrollment and majoring in technical fields, 
foreign languages, or in a qualified liberal arts program. Students could have 
received a grant amount up to $4,000. 
Work-Study Is a campus-based aid program and provides students with part-time work on-
campus. Colleges determine the hourly wage, and the amount earned cannot 
exceed the amount awarded. 
Veterans and Military Benefits Benefits are education related payments to veterans, military personnel, or 
students whose parent/s died during military service. These benefits are non-
need-based. 
Hope Scholarship Provided a maximum credit of $1,800 for tuition and fee expenses. Credit was 
only available for students in their first two years of enrollment. The AOTC 
replaced the Hope Scholarship in 2009. 
Lifetime Learning Credit (LLC) Allows for a tax credit up to $2,000 for qualified education expenses. 
American Opportunity Tax 
Credit (AOTC) 
AOTC replace the Hope Scholarship in 2009 and allows for a credit up to $2,500 
for expenses related to tuition and fees and course materials. The amount of the 
credit is 100 percent for the first $2,000 of qualified education expenses and 25 
percent for the next $2,000. 
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Appendix 1.D. Description of Loan Forgiveness and Conditional Grant/Loan 
Programs 
 
In 1998, Congress created a loan forgiveness program that allowed teachers to have 
$5,000 of their Stafford loans forgiven after five years of teaching in a low-income school. In 
2004, Congress passed legislation that supplemented the 1998 teacher loan forgiveness program 
by raising the forgiveness amount to $17,500 for teachers in mathematics, science, or special 
education. Congress approved of another loan forgiveness program in 2007 that relieved a 
student’s loan debt in exchange for their employment in a public sector job, which includes 
military service, nursing, first responders, and general employment for an organization that is 
considered to be a 501(c)(3) (non-profit). Congress created a conditional grant/loan in 2007 
called the Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH), which 
provides up to $4,000 annually in grants to students who intend to teach full-time in high-need 
subject areas at low-income schools. If the student does not fulfill the teaching obligations within 
eight years after graduating from college, the grant converts to a loan.  
Loan forgiveness and conditional grant/loan programs have one or more of the following 
goals: to provide financial assistance for students to pay for college by reducing individuals’ 
dependency on student loans; to persuade individuals to choose a specific college major or career 
occupation; to attract individuals to work in a job or underserved region for specific period of 
time; or to encourage individuals to work and remain in either a occupation of high need and/or a 
specific region (McCallion, 2005). Understanding the difference between the two programs can 
be confusing, as there is not a universally accepted definition of these programs by researchers 
and policymakers. For example, “conditional grants” may sometimes be referred to as “loan 
forgiveness programs” and “loan forgiveness programs” may sometimes be labeled as “loan 
repayment programs” (McCallion, 2005; see Spero, 1986, & Maplethorpe, 2001, as an example).  
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Despite the mismatch in labels, researchers can distinguish the two programs by how they 
operate and are administered. For a conditional grant/loan, the recipient receives the award while 
in school and has to fulfill certain service or work requirements after graduating (National 
Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs, 2010). If the recipient fails to fulfill the 
service obligations, the award becomes a loan that the recipient pays back. With loan 
forgiveness, the recipient is able to have the loan repaid or forgiven, in whole or in part, after 
fulfilling certain service or work obligations (NASSGAP, 2010). Typically, if the recipient fails 
the service obligations after a pre-determined period of time, the recipient becomes ineligible to 
have his/her loan forgiven. In other words, the difference between the two programs is that 
conditional grants or loans operate while the student is in school while loan forgiveness works to 
help the student after he or she graduates. 
 To illustrate the operation of conditional grants and loan forgiveness, Figure 1.6 
compares the programs in terms of a student paying for college with a student loan. In Figure 
1.6, there are three students paying $5,000 in tuition at a university, with student 1 receiving a 
conditional grant worth $5,000 and both students 2 and student 3 financing their degree with a 
$5,000 loan. Student 2 is majoring in a certain field knowing that he/she will be eligible to have 
the loan forgiven if working in a public sector occupation. At the end of college, both students 1 
and 2 must make a decision of whether to enter the public sector. If the student(s) decide to 
fulfill their service requirements, the student(s) would be relieved of having to incur debt. 
Fundamentally, both conditional grants and loan forgiveness programs have the same payoff for 
service and have similar results when one does not fulfill the service requirement. If students 1 
and 2 decide not to go into the public sector, both will incur a loan debt and will make loan 
repayments similar to those of student 3. 
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Figure 1.6. Comparison of Loan Forgiveness and Conditional Grant/Loan Programs 
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Chapter 2. Denying Loan Access: The Student-Level Consequences 
When Community Colleges Opt Out of the Stafford Loan 
Program 
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Over the past two decades, rising college tuition rates and a decline in the purchasing 
power of need-based grants have lead student loans to become a key component of the financial 
aid system in the United States. According to the College Board (2013), over 8 million 
undergraduates borrow federal loans each year, and for the 2011-12 academic year, the federal 
government provided over 80 billion in Stafford loans. In comparison, roughly 34 billion was 
spent on the Pell grant, the nation’s largest need-based grant program. For 2013, over two-thirds 
of students graduating from college had an average debt load of $28,400, which is up 2% from 
the year before (The Institute for College Access & Success, 2014b) 
Students using loans to pay for college and the resulting debt have been central to the 
broader national dialogue concerning rising debt levels. The nation’s student loan debt grew 
$124 billion this past year and has become the second largest form of debt at $1.12 trillion 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2014). This trend has led to growing concern that the U.S. 
is facing a student loan debt crisis (Kamenetz, 2006; Salas Gage & Lorin, 2014), as increasing 
debt levels, fewer employment opportunities and low salaries leave some borrowers struggling to 
repay (Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2013). Nationally, student loan default rates have 
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risen steadily over the past decade: today 13.7 percent of borrowers default on their federal loans 
within 3 years of entering repayment (U.S. Department of Education, 2014f). 
 The degree to which students can repay their loans is of special concern for colleges. 
Each year, the U.S. Department of Education calculates a cohort default rate (CDR) for colleges, 
which measures the share of borrowers who fail to repay their loans. If a CDR is over 30 percent 
for three consecutive years, the federal government can sanction and prohibit the college from 
offering currently enrolled students any federal financial aid, including the Pell grant, for three 
years. Colleges with a CDR above 40 percent for one year lose their participation in the federal 
Stafford loan program, but still have eligibility to offer Pell grants to students. Previous research 
by Darolia (2013) demonstrates the negative effects for institutions having default rates above 
sanctioned thresholds. Among institutions that offer academic programs of two years or less, 
becoming ineligible to offer students federal financial aid decreases enrollment by approximately 
12 to 16 percent. The impact is even greater – almost 18 percent – at for-profit institutions.   
To avoid sanction and retain the use of federal financial aid, some colleges opt out of the 
federal Stafford loan program and prohibit students the opportunity to borrow loans with no 
guarantee of replacing the loan amount with another type of aid.14 The idea behind this action is 
simple: if a college has students graduating with no debt, the college is not exposed to having a 
default rate measure that incurs federal sanction. The Institute for College Access & Success 
(2014a) estimates that roughly 8.5 percent of all community college students in the United States 
do not have access to federal loans because the colleges they attend do not participation in 
federal loan programs.  
                                                
14 This policy is different from the no-loan policies found at the Ivy League or highly selective postsecondary 
institutions, as the no-loan policies for these elite institutions substitute loans for another non-repayable grant or 
scholarship (DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2002a). 
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While community colleges may believe that opting out is in students’ best interest, it is 
possible that limiting loan access has negative consequences for students. Becker’s (1993) 
human capital investment model helps illuminate how students’ inability to take out federal loans 
may condition their educational trajectories in ways that affect their progression toward degree 
completion and other educational outcomes.15 According to Becker, the amount of time an 
individual spends on school-related activities is inversely proportional to the time spent on 
leisure and working. Without access to loans, financially constrained students are likely to 
allocate a larger portion of their time to paid employment in order to pay for college, or enroll in 
fewer course credits to reduce the direct costs. Alternatively, the receipt of loans provides 
students an option for financing their education that does not involve reducing the amount of 
time spent on school-related activities and facilitates faster time to degree completion.  
 The focus of this paper is to investigate how a community college’s participation in the 
federal Stafford loan program affects students’ educational performance and completion. Do 
existing financial aid programs or employment make up for the loss of student loans? Does loan 
borrowing affect students’ credit accumulation and degree completion? To determine whether 
student loans help students succeed in college, I exploit the variation in loan policies from over 
50 community colleges that are a part of a statewide system (henceforth referred to as SCCS) 
located in a large southern state. Of the 50 community colleges, 15 were observed as opting out 
of the Stafford program. My empirical strategy combines fixed-effects and instrumental variable 
strategies to estimate the within college differences in student outcomes before and after a 
college opts out of the federal loan program. I use administrative records of students who 
enrolled for the first-time between 2001-02 and 2009-10; however, I analyze outcomes on Pell-
eligible students for whom the data are collected most consistently. 
                                                
15 More information about the theoretical framework is provided in Appendix 2.A. 
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 I find that Pell-eligible students enrolling when the community college offered federal 
loans are 7.6 percentage points more likely to borrow than students who enrolled after the 
community college opted out of the federal loan program. The overall amount borrowed also 
increases $368. I also find that after the switch in loan policy, institutions did not replace the loss 
in loan amounts with another financial aid program. I find no evidence that loan borrowing 
statistically improves degree completion and transfer to a 4-year institution, but do find that Pell-
eligible students borrowing a loan attempted 19 additional credits and were more likely to 
attempt and complete math and science courses than non-borrowers.  
In Section 2.2, I describe previous research on student loans in order to illustrate the lack 
of research examining the relationship between loan borrowing and students’ educational 
outcomes. Section 2.3 highlights students’ loan use within SCCS and explanations for why 
SCCS colleges opt out of the federal loan program. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 describe the data and 
sample used for analysis. Section 2.6 describes my empirical strategy. Results are in Section 2.7 
and concluding thoughts are in Section 2.8. 
2.2. Research on Students Loans 
 
Researchers know little about whether loans help students succeed in college. In theory, 
the availability of loans removes credit constraints and affords educational opportunities to many 
students who may not otherwise have been able to attend college. However, the findings on 
student loans have been inconsistent. Some studies have found that loans exert a positive 
influence on college outcomes (Chen & DesJardins, 2008; Cofer & Somers, 2000), while others 
have found insignificant or negative effects (Braunstein, McGrath, & Pescatrice, 2000-2001; 
DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2002b; Dowd & Coury, 2006).  
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Estimating the effects of loans on college outcomes can be difficult because students’ 
loan receipt is not randomly assigned. In the United States, the federal loan program is designed 
in such a way that students self-select their loan amount. Simply comparing outcomes between 
student loan borrowers and non-borrowers is likely to produce biased estimates because there are 
possible unobserved differences between the two groups that could be associated with the 
decision on whether or not to borrow. In absence of a randomized experiment, the challenge is to 
counteract this self-selection bias. More recently, researchers have begun to employ quasi-
experimental approaches by exploiting an exogenous assignment that determines whether a 
student is eligible for a loan. This approach allows for the development of a counterfactual of 
what students would do in absence of receiving a loan.  
 Two studies examining student loan programs outside of the United States employ a 
quasi-experimental research method and find positive effects with loan eligibility. Both of these 
studies use a regression discontinuity design around a minimum score that determines whether or 
not a student can be offered a loan. Gurgand, Lorenceau, and Melonio (2011) examined a private 
loan program in South Africa, and students whose parents’ credit score was just above the 
eligibility threshold were 20 percentage points more likely to enroll in college. Solis (2012) 
examined students’ college admission test scores and, like Gurgand, et. al. (2011), found a 20 
percentage point increase in the probability of enrollment with eligibility for loan programs in 
Chile. Additionally, Solis found that access to loans lead to a lower dropout rate, as loan eligible 
students were more likely to enroll in the second and third years of college. 
Of the studies evaluating student loans in the United States, most of the research 
examines student loans in relationship to college enrollment or post-college employment 
decisions. Dynarski (2003) uses a difference-in-difference strategy to examine the change in 
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federal loan availability with the removal of home equity in the financial aid formula. She found 
that federal loan eligibility had a weak effect on college enrollment. Rothstein and Rouse (2010) 
evaluated a no-loan policy at a highly selective university where the loan component of students’ 
financial aid awards was replaced with grants. Their findings suggested that debt increased the 
probability of students choosing a high-salary job rather than a job that has low pay or in the 
public sector.  
There is little research that examines the effect of U.S. loan programs on students’ 
educational outcomes. In the paper most related to the present analysis, Dunlop (2012) exploits 
the variation in community colleges’ participation in the federal Stafford loan program. Using 
the Beginning Postsecondary Student Study of 2004, Dunlop uses a community college’s federal 
loan participation as an instrument to estimate the effect of the loan amount borrowed on credits 
completed, degree attainment, and transfer to a 4-year college. Dunlop mostly interprets findings 
from the reduced form estimations, but her results suggest that limiting loan access indeed 
decreases loan borrowing and hinders the transfer to a four-year college. Results on other 
outcomes, such as credits completed, were statistically insignificant.  
Because Dunlop uses cross-sectional variation in community colleges’ loan participation, 
the composition of students across colleges could be different. Community colleges operate to 
serve the surrounding community, and the composition of the student body could reflect the 
community’s socioeconomic characteristics, some of which could be associated with students’ 
decisions on whether or not to borrow a loan. In addition, colleges are likely to develop academic 
and financial aid programs that are tailored to meet the needs of the surrounding area. Dunlop’s 
analysis does not fully account for these institutional differences and whether institutions help 
students’ make-up for the loss of loan access. To do so would require longitudinal observation 
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within an institution to see how students respond before and after the change in loan policy, 
which is the contribution of my paper.   
2.3. Loan Policies Within the Statewide Community College System (SCCS) 
 
To analyze how participation in the federal loan program affects students’ education 
outcomes, I examine the loan policies from the 50 public community colleges within the SCCS. 
In comparison to other community colleges nationwide, SCCS contains a significantly high 
number of community colleges that have opted out of the federal Stafford loan program. For 
example, during the 2001-02 academic year, over 70 percent of all public 2-year institutions in 
the United States participated in the Stafford loan program. In comparison, only 60 percent of 
SCCS institutions offered federal loans. By 2009-10, the share of public 2-year participating was 
still over 70 percent nationwide, whereas participation among SCCS institutions dropped to 
almost 35 percent.  
Between 2001-02 and 2009-10, 15 community colleges in the SCCS altered their federal 
loan policy. Using data from the U.S. Department of Education’s (2014g) Title IV Program 
Volume Reports, Figure 2.1 displays the number of Stafford loans each of the 15 institutions 
disbursed to students. At some point, these 15 community colleges opted to not participate in the 
federal loan program. The horizontal line indicates when the switch to not offering loans 
occurred. Institution 3 is the only the institution altering their loan policy twice: opting out in 
2002-03, and then reinstating students’ borrowing privileges in the 2007-08 academic year.  
Despite the decrease in the number of SCCS institutions offering federal Stafford loans, 
the proportion of its students borrowing has substantially increased. Figure 2.2 displays the 
growth in borrowing by incoming cohort for all SCCS institutions over a 9-year period; 
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Figure 2.1. Number of Stafford Loan Disbursements 
 
Notes: The community colleges represented are the 15 colleges observed as having opted 
out of the Stafford loan program between 2001-02 and 2009-10. The academic year the 
institution switched loan policy is in parentheses.  
Source: U.S. Department of Education (2014g) 
 
Figure 2.2. Share of First-Time Students Borrowing, by School's Loan Participation 
 
Notes: Graph illustrates the share of first-time students borrowing a loan in each academic 
year. School’s loan participation is based on the number of disbursements from 2001-02 to 
2009-10. Institutions that never disbursed Stafford loans during that time period are considered 
“never.” Institutions that offered loans and then switched to not offering are “sometimes.” 
Institutions that always offered loans over the time period are considered “always.”  
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the growth trajectories are also disaggregated according to the institutional loan policy (students 
from institutions that never offered loans, always offered loans, or changed loan policy during 
the time period). As the graph illustrates, the overall growth in borrowing has largely resulted 
from increases among students from institutions that continually offered loans. 
 In a series of reports, The Institute for College Access & Success (2008, 2011, 2014a) 
offers three explanations for why community colleges choose not to participate in federal loan 
programs. I had discussions with financial aid directors from 6 of the 30 SCCS community 
colleges that never offered federal loans or were observed as opting out that provided similar 
explanations.  
 The first explanation for not providing students with loans concerns the repercussions 
that community colleges face under the cohort default rate sanctions. Since a majority of students 
attending these institutions receive a Pell grant, administrators said it was imperative that their 
institution maintains eligibility to offer Pell grants. If they were to lose their eligibility, 
administrators felt that students would not enroll and the decreasing enrollment rate would affect 
the community college’s ability to remain open. 
 Based the data published by the U.S. Department of Education (2014f), Figure 2.3 
illustrates that a majority of the 15 community colleges switching loan programs had a cohort 
default rate below 20 percent. Only 3 of the 15 institutions (9, 13, and 15) were close to the 
threshold for sanctions before opting out of the federal loan program (sanction levels indicated 
by black vertical lines). For these 3, the high default rates – including 35 percent at institution 15 
(40 percent triggers a one-year sanction) – occurred the year before the change in loan policy. 
Despite the few community colleges with high default rates, federal sanction has never been 
imposed on any SCCS institution.  
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 Figure 2.3. Cohort Default Rate for the 15 Community Colleges 
 
Notes: The two horizontal black bars at 30 and 40 percent represent the federal sanction 
thresholds. The dotted horizontal bar at 25 percent represents the federal sanction 
threshold prior to 2014. The vertical line represents the academic year the community 
college opted out of the federal loan program. The academic year the institution 
switched loan policy is in parentheses. 
Source: U.S. Department of Education (2014f) 
 
 
 
 The second explanation for why community colleges do not offer loans follows from the 
low tuition rates at these institutions and the existence of other federal and state aid programs 
that cover a large portion of students’ expenses. Administrators argue that, given the low tuition, 
students do not need a loan because federal need-based aid grants, state aid programs, and 
institutional grants should be sufficient to assist students in paying for college. Tuition rates for 
SCCS institutions are set at the state level and are uniform across all colleges. For the 2011-12 
academic year, the average in-state tuition rate for SCCS institutions was approximately 20 
percent less than the national average (U.S. Department of Education, 2014b). When considering 
the number of federal and state need-based aid programs available to SCCS students, 
administrators say that the price of paying for college out of pocket is relatively low, even when 
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considering the cost of attendance.16 If there is any remaining need after the application of 
federal and state aid to students’ aid packages, administrators stated that institutional aid or aid 
from privately funded sources should be able to cover the remaining balance.  
 Finally, administrators at some community colleges believe that providing students with 
the option of borrowing opens students to the possibility of over-borrowing and taking on debt 
that is beyond their means. Heavily indebted students need high-paying jobs in order to make 
their loan payments, and defaulting can have serious consequences for students. The geographic 
area in which the community college is located plays an important factor in institutions’ 
decisions to offer loans: several administrators mentioned that the surrounding county has a very 
high unemployment rate and few future employment opportunities. Given students’ limited post-
graduation job prospects, administrators believe that providing students with an easily obtainable 
loan is a recipe for enduring financial consequences for students and a high default rate for the 
institution. Yet, county unemployment data does not suggest there was a significant jump in 
unemployment prior to the change in loan policy across the 15 institutions.17 If there was an 
uptick in unemployment, it occurs after the change in policy and is reflective of the Great 
Recession that occurred in 2008. Additionally, the county unemployment rate for the 15 
institutions is fairly close to the state rate between 2000 and 2010.  
 According to the aid administrators with whom I spoke, the schools do not offset the loss 
of the loan with a grant that matches dollar for dollar what the loan would provide. Instead, they 
rely on existing federal and state aid programs. When asked what portion of financial aid 
                                                
16 During the 2010-11 academic year, for example, the average cost for a traditionally aged (less than 24) full-time 
student living off-campus with a family was almost $8,000.16 For these students, a majority of their financial need is 
met by the Pell grant, as the maximum award for that year was $5,500 and covered 68 percent of the cost. However, 
the cost of attendance for a full-time student who does not live with his or her parents can be upwards of $15,000. 
While federal grants can cover a portion of their financial need, these students can rely on the various state aid 
programs specific to community colleges and public institutions in the state. The award amounts from these 
programs range from $1,500 up to $4,000. 
17 Figure 2.5 in Appendix 2.B displays the county unemployment rates for the 15 community colleges. 
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applicants is eligible for a Pell grant, all administrators interviewed estimated figures between 85 
to 90 percent.18 Most of these Pell-eligible students have their direct costs covered with existing 
aid programs. But what about the 10 to 15 percent who are ineligible for a Pell grant? They lose 
loan eligibility when their institution opts out, and a small fraction of these students are eligible 
to receive a grant through the various state aid programs. Administrators also mentioned they 
have institutional grants available for these students, but noted that not all students will be 
eligible, especially ones with higher expected family contributions.  
 At some SCCS institutions, the decision to opt out of the federal Stafford loan program 
does not necessarily apply to private loans. Compared to federal loans, a private loan does not 
provide flexible repayment options and traditionally carries higher interest rates. Because the 
federal government does not back this type of loan, private loans are not considered in an 
institution’s cohort default rate. Consequently, some colleges direct students to private lenders to 
avoid federal sanction. On the website for one SCCS institution, for example, the financial aid 
office explicitly states that the college does not participate in the federal loan program, but if 
students would like to take out a loan, the financial aid webpage suggests that students borrow 
through a private lender. Currently, however, the use of private loans among SCCS students 
appears to be relatively small. According to SCCS administrative data, less than 1 percent of 
students borrow a non-federal loan.19 This should be regarded as a lower bound estimate, 
however, as students may take out a private loan and not report it to the college’s financial aid 
office. 
 
                                                
18 Using SCCS administrative files, 37 percent of all SCCS students receive a Pell grant. Among aid recipients, 75 
percent receive a Pell grant. 
19 Only students who report to the college that they borrowed a private loan will be reflected in the administrative 
data.  
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2.4. Data Description 
 
For my analysis, I use student-level administrative records from the over 50 public, 
degree-granting community colleges that are part of the SCCS. The records reflect reporting for 
each semester students are enrolled for-credit between the 2001-02 and 2009-10 academic years. 
This dataset includes detailed information on student demographics, receipt of financial aid, 
courses taken, credits attempted and completed, grades earned, and degrees received. In total, 
there are over 600,000 students represented in the administrative dataset.     
 These student records were also matched to the student-level database maintained by the 
National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) and the state’s Unemployment Insurance (UI) records.20 
The NSC tracked students’ enrollment at postsecondary institutions from 1997 to 2012, allowing 
me to examine the students’ post-secondary enrollment prior and subsequent to enrollment in the 
SCCS. The NSC data contains information on degrees received, fields of study, and the duration 
of enrollment at a particular institution.   
 The UI records provide an opportunity to examine students’ earnings and employment 
both while enrolled in and after their exit from a postsecondary institution. There is one 
limitation to using the UI records as a measure of employment, however, because earnings are 
reported quarterly and the records do not include information on the number of hours the 
individual worked. Data on hours worked would provide more accurate estimates of the time 
directed to employment rather than school-related activities. Instead, I align the quarterly 
earnings to the term schedules at the community colleges. This approach allows me to calculate 
students’ total income during a semester in which they are enrolled. I use 4th quarter wages as a 
                                                
20 It is worth noting that the UI records reflect in-state employment and excludes earnings from out-of-state or self-
employment. For concerns of students working out-of-state, a sensitivity check was conducted by estimating 
outcomes excluding students attending college near the state boarder. The results did not change from my main 
findings.  
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measure of employment participation and wages for the fall semester, 1st quarter for the winter 
semester, and the 2nd quarter for the spring/summer semester.  
I identify whether or not a community college opts out of the federal Stafford loan 
program in a given year using financial aid program data from the U.S. Department of Education 
(2014g). This data provides information on the total volume of federal loans disbursed by higher 
education institutions. I consider a community college as not participating in the federal loan 
program when the number of loan disbursements for subsidized and unsubsidized Stafford loans 
is 0.21  
To account for time varying college characteristics, I use data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (2014) and the Delta Cost Project (2014). Data from the BLS provides measures on 
county unemployment rates. The Delta database is derived from data reported in the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System and includes measures on institutional expenditures.22 For 
this study, I use expenditures on student services, academic support, and scholarships and 
fellowships.  
2.5. Sample Description 
 
 There are 603,522 first-time students from all 50 community colleges represented in the 
SCCS administrative files. One limitation to the SCCS financial aid data is that it consists of only 
295,494 students who received financial aid during their enrollment in a SCCS community 
college. This means that financial aid information, such as Expected Family Contribution (EFC) 
and aid amounts, is missing for any student who did not receive any financial aid. The lack of 
information on these non-financial aid recipients makes it problematic to compare students 
                                                
21 For a small number of community colleges, the total number of loan disbursements from 2001-02 to 2009-10 was 
less than 10 at each community college and the disbursements would happen in one year. It is unclear why these 
institutions would have an outlying year by disbursing a small number of loans. For those colleges that have a 
single, small disbursement year, I recoded the disbursement to 0.     
22 Delta Cost data provides consistent measures for variables that may have changed overtime in the IPEDS data. 
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within and across institutions, because a change in loan policy potentially alters the composition 
of students represented in the financial aid dataset. For example, a student with a financial aid 
package consisting of only loans from the period when the institution participated in the federal 
loan programs appears in the data. But a similar student attending the same institution after the 
college stopped offering federal loans would not appear in the financial aid dataset.  
To account for this data limitation, I use a sample of 206,255 Pell-eligible students with 
the assumption that if a student applied for financial aid and was Pell-eligible, the student would 
take the Pell Grant they were offered and would be represented in the financial aid dataset 
regardless of the institution’s loan policy. From a policy point of view, focusing on Pell-eligible 
students is important because this segment of the student population is most sensitive to changes 
in college price and financial aid (Heller, 1997). Any changes in aid amounts or limiting access 
to aid programs that are intended to improve persistence and completion rates should be 
examined to determine whether such action is beneficial for this subset of students. 
 It is important to discuss how limiting the sample to Pell grant students relates to the 
interpretation of the results. This paper does not fully address the impacts of student loans 
replacing other forms of financial aid (i.e. only borrowing a loan with no other aid versus no 
financial aid at all). Because the sample includes Pell grant recipients, results should be 
interpreted as the effect of student loans supplementing grant aid.   
 To better understand how Pell-eligible students in SCCS compare to all SCCS students, 
Table 2.1 presents the summary statistics for all 603,522 students in SCCS (column 1) and 
206,255 Pell-eligible students (Column 2). Only column 1 includes both aid and non-aid 
recipients. The first row for each variable in Table 2.1 displays the average values and the second  
 
65 
 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics of SCCS Students 
   
All SCCS 
Institutions 
All SCCS 
Institutions 
(Pell-Eligible) 
Never Change 
Loan Policy 
Change Loan Policy 
 Loan 
Access 
No Loan 
Access 
  (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) 
Student Characteristics      
Age at entry 26.58 26.41 26.28 27.23 26.56 
 (10.43) (9.75) (9.66) (10.30) (9.78) 
Race/ethnicity      
White 0.62 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.44 
Black 0.27 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.43 
Hispanic 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
Other race 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.11 
      Female 0.58 0.66 0.66 0.68 0.67 
      In-state resident 0.90 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.93 
      Prior fraction of quarters employed 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.50 
 (0.37) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.36) 
Student Financial Aid & Earnings       
Share of students with access to loans 0.52 0.50 0.52 1.00 0.00 
      Receiving financial aid 0.38 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
      Eligible for Pell Grant 0.34 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
      Borrowed loan in 1st year 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.00 
Borrowed a federal loan in 1st year 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.00 
Borrowed a non-federal loan in 1st year 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 
      Loan amount in 1st year ($) 132.38 264.34 321.32 167.28 6.43 
 (856.47) (1228.56) (1355.55) (898.84) (192.89) 
      Received federal, state, or institutional 
grant in 1st year 0.37 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00 
      Grant Amount in 1st year ($) 1012.50 2814.62 2829.52 2275.41 3127.60 
 (1755.02) (1921.57) (1934.89) (1547.15) (2010.58) 
      Expected Family Contribution ($) 1388.57 628.30 643.94 598.26 559.99 
 (4101.12) (1148.31) (1159.84) (1127.30) (1092.38) 
      Worked while enrolled in 1st year ($) 0.61 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.53 
      Earnings while enrolled in 1st year ($) 3460.42 2674.51 2733.38 2646.70 2354.34 
 (6166.00) (4451.85) (4482.71) (4473.28) (4237.89) Student Educational Outcomes      
Credits attempted in 1st year 14.56 16.56 16.45 17.03 16.84 
 (9.76) (9.46) (9.45) (9.67) (9.36) 
      Credits completed in 1st year 12.28 13.34 13.09 14.49 13.97 
 (9.79) (9.93) (9.85) (10.43) (9.93) 
      Ever enrolled full-time in 1st year 0.43 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.57 
      Obtain AA within 3 years of entry 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.08 
      Transfer to 4yr within 4 years of entry 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.18 
Number of Obs. 603,522 206,255 158,572 20,285 27,398 
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Column 1 consists of all students in SCCS. Column 2 consists of all Pell-
eligible students in SCCS. Column 3 contains Pell-eligible students attending an SCCS community college that 
never changed the loan policy. Column 5 and 6 consist of Pell-eligible students at the 15 colleges that opted out of 
the Stafford loan program, separated by whether the students have loan access. Dollar amounts are in 2012 dollars. 
Obtain AA within 3 years of entry and transfer to a 4yr within 4 years of entry consists of students who enrolled 
before the 2007-08 academic year.  
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row indicates the standard deviations. When comparing the Pell-eligible students to all students 
in SCCS, there are several things worth noting. First, there is a larger share of minorities and 
females among Pell-eligible students. Less half of Pell-eligible students are white, compared to 
62 percent of all students in SCCS. Second, the overall share of student in SCCS having access 
to federal loans is 52 percent, which is similar for Pell-eligible students (50 percent). However, 
the share of students borrowing a loan is fairly small for both groups. For all of SCCS, only 3 
percent of students borrowed, compared to the 7 percent of Pell-eligible students. Third, over 
half of Pell-eligible students enroll full-time for at least one semester in their first year of 
enrollment, compared to the 43 percent of all students in SCCS. This difference in enrollment 
intensity might reflect the higher share of SCCS students working while enrolled (61 percent vs. 
58 percent).  
 Table 2.1 also presents the summary statistics for Pell-eligible students at SCCS college 
that never change their loan policy (column 3) and the Pell-eligible students at the 15 community 
college switching their loan policy, disaggregated according to students’ ability to borrow a 
Stafford loan (columns 5 and 6). Demographically, students at the 15 community colleges look 
very similar to students at colleges with no change in loan policy. However, of the 47,683 Pell-
eligible students at the 15 community colleges, only 20,285 (43 percent) had access to loans, 
which is lower than the 52 percent at colleges that never change loan policy. Because of this 
difference in the availability of loans, the students in the 15 colleges borrow at a lower rate and 
have a lower average loan amount.23     
Table 2.1 also illustrates that there are a few notable differences between students with 
loan access and students without loan access. First, the EFC is lower for students without access  
                                                
23 Figure 2.6 in Appendix 2.B displays the share of students receiving aid by academic year of entry. Across all 
years, the 15 community colleges had a higher share of students receiving aid than community colleges that never 
changed their loan policy. However, the trends overtime between the two groups are similar.  
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Figure 2.4. Share of Pell-Eligible Students Borrowing Federal or Non-Federal Loans 
 
Notes: Graph illustrates the share of first-time Pell-eligible students receiving a federal 
or non-federal loan. The vertical line represents the academic year the community 
college opted out of the federal loan program. The academic year the institution 
switched loan policy is in parentheses. 
 
 
 
to Stafford loans: $559, compared to $598 for students with loan access. Second, for grants, 
students without loan access received, on average, $852 more than students with loan access. 
Third, among students who have access to federal loans, 5 percent borrowed either a federal or 
non-federal loan and the average loan amount was $167. In comparison, less than 1 percent of 
students without loan access took out a loan, and the average loan amount was $6, which 
suggests that a small portion of the sample without loan access either borrowed a private loan (.2 
percent) or was somehow able to borrow a federal loan (.1 percent). Figure 2.4 displays the share 
of Pell-eligible students receiving either a federal or non-federal loan before and after the change 
in loan policy for the 15 community colleges. The horizontal line indicates when the switch from 
offering loans to not offering loans occurred. As mentioned before, Institution 3 opted out of the 
federal loan program in 2002-03 and then reinstated their participation in the federal loan 
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program in 2007-08. Figure 2.4 demonstrates that institutions did not substitute the loss of 
federal loans with non-federal loans. There are, however, some students, albeit a small share, 
receiving federal loans during the period when institutions were no longer participating in the 
federal loan program. These students received a loan in their first year of enrollment because 
they either transferred to or were dually enrolled at an institution that was offering federal 
loans.24  
2.5.1. Comparison of SCCS Sample to Nationally Representative Sample 
 
To illustrate how the community college students from SCCS colleges compare to a 
nationally representative sample, Table 2.2 presents sample means from the 2012 wave of the 
National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) (columns 1 and 2) and the SCCS (columns 
3 and 4). Column 1 is estimates for all community college students and column 2 consists of 
Pell-eligible community college students represented in the NPSAS. The estimates in columns 3 
and 4 provide the same information from columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.1.  
 In both the national and SCCS samples, the average age is close to 26 years old and over 
half of the students are female. Compared to the samples in the NPSAS, the SCCS has a higher 
share of Black students and smaller share of Hispanic students. The average EFC for all SCCS 
students is also lower than the NPSAS but SCCS Pell-eligible students (column 4) have a 
comparable EFC to NPSAS Pell-eligible students (column 2). These differences in racial 
composition and EFC amounts could be attributed to the state in which SCCS resides, where 
there is a large African American population and the average household income is lower than the 
national average. According to the most recent Census estimates, over 20 percent of the  
 
                                                
24 The share of students transferring in the first year is low, less than 5 percent. Regressions were performed to 
determine whether loan policy was correlated with transfer rates. The results provided no significant differences. 
More information on transfer rates is provided in Appendix 2.C.  
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Table 2.2. Comparison of SCCS Students to National Sample of Students 
  NPSAS:12 NPSAS:12 SCCS SCCS 
 All Community 
Colleges 
All Community 
Colleges  
(Pell-Eligible) 
All SCCS 
Institutions 
All SCCS 
Institutions 
(Pell-Eligible) 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Student Characteristics 
    Age 26.27 26.22 26.58 26.41 
 
(9.83) (9.14) (10.43) (9.75) 
Race/ethnicity 
    White 0.53 0.44 0.62 0.49 
Black 0.19 0.26 0.27 0.41 
Hispanic 0.19 0.21 0.04 0.03 
Other Race 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 
     Female 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.66 
     Ever full-time during school year 0.38 0.43 0.43 0.53 
     Student Financial Aid & Employment  
    Share of students with access to loans 0.87 0.85 0.52 0.50 
     Receiving financial aid 0.57 0.88 0.38 1.00 
     Eligible for Pell grant 0.66 1.00 0.34 1.00 
     Aid package 
    No aid 0.43 0.12 0.62 0.00 
Grants only 0.39 0.64 0.35 0.93 
Loans only 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Grants & loans 0.13 0.23 0.02 0.06 
     Borrowed a federal or non-federal loan 0.17 0.24 0.03 0.07 
Borrowed a federal loan 0.17 0.23 0.03 0.06 
Borrowed a non-federal loan 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
     Loan Amount ($) 762.58 1049.89 132.38 264.34 
 
(1973.75) (2275.10) (856.47) (1228.56) 
    Fed. Grants ($) 1288.27 2384.96 947.16 2707.90 
 
(1814.17) (1865.16) (1668.60) (1813.82) 
    State Grants ($) 221.97 304.39 125.62 315.43 
 
(793.97) (886.22) (546.18) (824.06) 
    Inst. Grants ($) 117.32 158.64 63.24 135.65 
 
(612.78) (682.31) (428.39) (622.43) 
    EFC ($) 5812.67 629.29 1388.57 628.30 
 
(10500.81) (1274.37) (4101.12) (1148.31) 
    Worked while enrolled 0.64 0.59 0.61 0.58 
N 18,230 12,260 603,522 206,255 
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 are from NPSAS restricted datasets and use NPSAS weights. Columns 3 & 4 are from 
the SCCS administrative files and contain the same estimates from Table 2.1. Columns 1 and 3 contain all first-
time, first-year students who enrolled at a public, 2-year college, represented in respective datasets. Columns 2 
and 4 consist of first-time, first-year students who enrolled at a public, 2-year and filed a FAFSA with an EFC 
that qualified them to be Pell-eligible. All dollar amounts have been adjusted to 2012 dollars.  
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population in the state is African American, compared to 13.2 percent nationwide.25 The state’s 
median household income in 2013 was approximately $46,000, whereas the national median 
household income was close to $53,000.  
 Given that the average EFC is lower, Pell-eligible SCCS students (column 4) receive, on 
average, a higher amount of federal grant aid than Pell-eligible students in the national sample 
(column 2). For state and institutional aid, the amounts are fairly similar for Pell-eligible 
students. Due to SCCS colleges’ lower rate of participation in the federal loan program and the 
high share of Pell-eligible students receiving grant aid, the share of students with access to 
federal loans and incurring debt is substantially lower than national estimates. The dollar amount 
of loans that SCCS students borrow is also less. 
2.6. Empirical Strategy 
 
 My identification strategy exploits the variation in student loan policies within the same 
community college over time. This involves using college fixed effects to estimate the within-
college difference in student outcomes before and after the college opted out the federal loan 
program. The before and after difference in student outcomes at the 15 community colleges 
opting out of federal loan programs is compared with the before and after difference in student 
outcomes at community colleges that did not change their loan policy, resulting in what is 
essentially a multi-period difference-in-difference analysis.  
In the first part of my analysis, I use the following reduced form equation to examine 
whether there are differences in aid amounts between the periods when institutions offer loans 
and not offering loans. I also explore whether there are differences in students’ working while 
enrolled.  
                                                
25 Census estimates were retrieved from http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/index.html. 
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1 !!!!!!!!!"# = !! + !!!"#$%&%'"$(!" + !!!"#!"# + !!!!"# + !!!!"!! + !! + !! + !!"# 
where i represents students enrolled at community college c during academic year t, γ is the time 
fixed effect, and θ is the college fixed effect. X is a vector of student demographics, including 
age, indicator in-state residency, race/ethnicity, and gender. Students’ prior employment is also 
likely to influence whether students will be employed while in enrolled and enrollment intensity. 
To account for this, the demographic vector also includes a measure on the fraction of quarters 
employed in the 3 years prior to entry. EFC is a measure of students’ Expected Family 
Contribution (the amount of money families are expected to contribute toward the students’ 
college costs). The variable of interest, Participate, is an indicator that the given college 
participated in the loan program in the given year. δ consists of time-varying institutional 
measures on county unemployment rates and expenditures on student services and academic 
support in the year prior to a student’s enrollment. The random error term (µ) is bootstrapped and 
clustered at the school level.26  
 For the second part of my analysis, I examine the effect of loan receipt on educational 
outcomes, including credits attempted and completed in the first year, receipt of an associate’s 
degree, and transfer to a 4-year institution. If I estimate these student outcomes using only the 
reduced form equation above, estimates on the effect of loan borrowing are not fully captured 
because of the large share of students not borrowing a loan. Among SCCS Pell-eligible students, 
the share borrowing a loan is less than 8 percent. This motivates the use of an instrumental 
variable estimation that will allow for more generalizability on loan borrowing than a general 
comparison of Pell eligibility students before and after the change in loan policy. 
When equation (1) is estimated with a measure on whether a student borrowed a loan as a 
dependent variable, this creates the first stage in an instrumental variable analysis. Thus, a 
                                                
26 300 replications are performed for the bootstrapping. 
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community college’s participation in the federal loan program is used as an instrument to predict 
the probability of a student borrowing a loan. The second stage of the equation replaces the 
instrument with the predicted loan borrowing measure created from the first-stage equation (1). 
This approach minimizes bias due to endogeneity on loan receipt and allows for claims about the 
effect of loan receipt on college outcomes. The second stage equation is: !!(2)!!!!!!!!"# = !! + !!!"##"$!"# + !!!"#!"# + !!!!"! + !!!!"!! + !! + !! + !!"# 
The same set of fixed effects, student demographic, and institutional covariates mentioned above 
are included in the second stage equation. However, in the second part of my analysis I add 
students’ dollar amount of grants received to β3 in both first and second stages in order to control 
for the impact of grants on educational outcomes and the endogeneity of loan receipt.    
2.6.1. Identifying Assumptions27 
 
 Two important identifying assumptions for federal loan participation to be a valid 
instrument requires the timing of the institutional decision to be good as randomly assigned 
across individuals and only affect the outcome variable through its relationship with loan receipt 
(i.e. the instrument is not correlated with the error term). For the both of these assumptions, the 
biggest threat deals with the compositional difference of students before and after the change in 
policy. Students could be choosing to attend a specific community college because of the 
institution’s loan policy. Alternatively, the composition differences in students could be due to 
the community college themselves if their decision to change the loan policy was influenced by 
demographic changes in the student body. I use several approaches to evaluate whether the 
instrument of participating in the federal loan program is random or correlated with the error 
term. First, I examine whether there was been a change in the composition of Pell-eligible 
students by focusing on the 15 community colleges changing their loan policy. I use equation (1) 
                                                
27 Additional identifying assumptions are discussed in Appendix 2.C. 
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to compare students with and without loan access within an institution across various 
demographic and pre-college variables. Second, I examine whether or not students are likely to 
attend the closest community college. Third, I determine whether there has been a change in 
enrollment rates for first-time students after the change in loan policy.  
Table 2.3 provides estimates for the differences in student demographics and pre-college 
variables by loan availability. These student-level variables include age, gender, race/ethnicity, 
distance from high school to community college, limited English proficiency, parental status, 
homemaker status, academic disadvantages, disability, employment status in the quarter prior to 
the first semester of enrollment, and Expected Family Contribution (EFC). Each row in Table 2.3 
represents a separate regression of each variable on students’ loan access with fixed effects for 
institution and year. The mean and standard deviation for each variable for students who do not 
have access to loans is reported in column 2 and the sample size is provided in column 3.  
When considering all estimates as a whole, there are no apparent demographic 
differences between students who do not have loan access and those who do. There are, however, 
several differences worth discussing, with regards to age, Black and Hispanic students, and 
disability status. While these differences are significant, the magnitudes of these differences are 
small and thus unlikely to cause serious bias in the estimates. For example, students with loan 
access are 1.9 percentage points less likely to be Black. While this difference is significant at the 
5 percent level, this difference is small when considering the large share of students who are 
Black, comprising of 43 percent of the sample.  
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Table 2.3. Differences in Pre-College Variables by Loan Access 
  Participate Control Mean Sample Size 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Age at entry -0.615* 26.557 47,683 
 
(0.343) [9.778] 
   Female -0.009 0.671 47,683 
 
(0.013) [0.470] 
   White 0.019 0.437 47,683 
 
(0.014) [0.496] 
   Black -0.019** 0.433 47,683 
 
(0.009) [0.496] 
     Hispanic 0.004** 0.017 47,683 
 
(0.002) [0.130] 
   Other Race -0.004 0.112 47,683 
 
(0.014) [0.316] 
   Distance to community college (miles) -0.675 17.201 34,474 
 
(1.152) [29.802] 
   In-state Resident 0.004 0.932 47,683 
 
(0.006) [0.252] 
   Limited English Proficiency 0.001 0.003 47,683 
 
(0.001) [0.058] 
     Single Parent -0.014 0.070 47,683 
 
(0.016) [0.255] 
   Homemaker -0.003 0.039 47,683 
 
(0.008) [0.194] 
   Academically Disadvantaged 0.078 0.365 47,683 
 
(0.074) [0.482] 
   Handicap -0.008* 0.013 47,683 
 
(0.004) [0.113] 
   Employed 1quarter prior to entry 0.016 0.522 47,683 
 
(0.013) [0.500] 
     Earnings 1 quarter prior to entry -146.759 7147.441 47,683 
 
(482.299) [9765.362] 
   EFC at entry 18.398 503.013 47,683 
 
(28.011) [985.208] 
 Notes: Each row represents a separate regression of each variable on whether the student has loan 
access. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the institution level. The variable mean 
and standard deviation (in brackets) for students with loan access is reported in column 2 and the 
sample size for the regression is provided in column 3. Distance to community college is measured in 
miles and is the distance between students’ high school and community college. Distance to college is 
only available for students who reported a high school to the community college.  
*** <0.01 **<0.05 *<0.10 
 
 
 
75 
 
Measuring the distance between students’ primary home and community college can also 
help determine whether Pell-eligible students are choosing to attend a specific college based on 
loan policy. Table 2.3 illustrates that the difference in distance from students’ high school to 
community college is not statistically significant. But it is worth noting the geographic location 
of SCCS community colleges in relation to one another and their loan policy. Geographically, 
the 15 community colleges observed as having opted out of the Stafford loan program are evenly 
distributed throughout the state.28 Unique to SCCS is that no two community colleges reside 
within the same county. These 15 community colleges, and their respective counties, are often 
surrounded by, or close to, a county containing a community college that never changes their 
loan policy (either because it always participated or never participated). However, the majority 
of students still attend the closest community college. For example, for the 15 community 
college, roughly 77 percent of financial aid recipients attended a community college that was 
closest to their home; 13 percent attended a community college in a neighboring county, and; 10 
percent of the sample attended a community college that was deemed a far distance.29 
Regressions were estimated to determine if there was a difference in students attending the 
closest college or college deemed to be a far distance. The results indicated that there were no 
significant differences between students who do not have loan access and those who do.30  
One important threat that could make the instrument of loan participation invalid deals 
with the change in loan policy possibly influencing community colleges’ enrollment rates. 
Alternatively, a community college’s change in loan policy could have happened in conjunction 
                                                
28 A map of SCCS college is provided in Figure 2.8 in Appendix 2.D. 
29 Figure 2.9 in Appendix 2.D illustrates whether students are traveling far distances to attend one of the 15 
community colleges. The share of students attending a community college not closest to home or outside of the 
community college service district does not appear to change relative to the change in loan policy.  
30 Results from these regressions indicate that the difference were -0.003 (0.020) for attendance to closest 
community college and -0.004 (0.012) for attendance to community college in neighboring county or farther.  
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with or prior to another institutional decision that increased the college’s classroom capacity, 
such as opening a new building. To determine whether enrollment rates are correlated with the 
timing of the loan policy change for the 15 community colleges, I used data from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) (2014e) to examine whether there was a 
significant difference in the share of the student body attending for the first-time before and after 
the change in loan policy. In the first five years after the switch in loan policy, only 4 out of the 
15 community colleges increased the share of first-time of students by an average of 5 percent 
per year.31 To determine whether these enrollment changes are significant, I used equation 1 
without student and institutional controls and the share of first-time students as the dependent 
variable. Results from the fixed effects regression were highly insignificant and suggest that the 
change in loan policy did not influence enrollment rates.32  
 Another identifying assumption requires there to be a nonzero relationship between the 
instrument (federal loan participation) and the endogenous treatment variable (loan receipt). 
Researchers often gauge the strength of the relationship between the two variables from the first 
stage F-statistics. Since my regression models cluster the standard errors at the college level, I 
employ the Kleibergen-Paap Wald test. The F-statistic from the first stage is 23.20, which 
exceeds the rule-of-thumb value of 10 (Staiger & Stock, 1997) and the maximal value of 16.36 
proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). Because the F-statistic from the first stage exceeds 
recommended levels, the instrument on federal loan participation does not violate this 
assumption. 
 
 
                                                
31 Figure 2.10 in Appendix 2.D displays the share of students enrolling for the first time before and after the 
switching in loan policy for the 15 community colleges.  
32 Results from this regression indicate that the difference was -0.015 (0.014).  
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2.7. Results 
 
2.7.1. Main Results 
 
Table 2.4 presents the results for the first part of my analysis examining the effects of 
federal loan participation on financial aid and employment. Each panel contains results for 
separate topical outcomes: panel A examines student loans, panel B for grants, and panel F for 
employment while enrolled. In addition to examining all grant programs in panel B, I also 
examine the differences in grant receipt and amounts for federal (panel C), state (panel D), and 
institutional grant programs (panel E). Columns 1 and 3 only include academic year and college 
fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 add student demographic controls and time-varying community 
college measures. The standard errors are provided below each coefficient (cluster bootstrapped 
at the college level), followed by the mean of the dependent variable for students without access 
to loans (attend a community college that opted out of the federal loan program at the time of 
enrollment).  
As the results in Panel A in Table 2.4 illustrate, Pell-eligible students who attend an 
institution that is participating in the federal loan program are 7.6 percentage points more likely 
to borrow than students with no such access. Also, having federal loan access significantly 
increases overall borrowing by $368 a year, or $4,837 ($367.61/0.076) among the 7.6 percent 
who take loans. This effect is large, considering the average SCCS student borrows $132 in the 
first year ($4,400 among the 3 percent who take loans). 
Results in panel B suggest that Pell-eligible students enrolling when a community college 
participates in the federal loan program are less likely to receive grant aid (combination of 
federal, state, and institution). Estimates indicated that the share of Pell-eligible students 
receiving grant aid decreased by less than 1 percent before community colleges opted out of the  
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Table 2.4. Reduced Form Estimates - Effect of Participating in the Federal Loan Program 
on Financial Aid & Employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A Borrowed a Loan Loan Amount 
Participate in Federal Loan Program 0.077*** 0.076*** 361.95*** 367.61*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (99.16) (101.50) 
Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 0.00 6.19 
Panel B Received Any Grant Grant Amount 
Participate in Federal Loan Program -0.007*** -0.006** -49.78 39.40 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (74.16) (108.84) 
Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 1.00 2,857.75 
Panel C Received Federal Grant Federal Grant Amount 
Participate in Federal Loan Program 0.013 0.014 -16.45 60.23 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (72.21) (105.89) 
Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 0.92 2,732.65 
Panel D Received State Grant State Grant Amount 
Participate in Federal Loan Program -0.004 -0.001 -27.13 -8.70 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (22.96) (25.59) 
Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 0.22 324.65 
Panel E Received Institutional Grant Institutional Grant Amount 
Participate in Federal Loan Program -0.009 -0.009 -5.71 -7.27 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (17.33) (17.19) 
Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 0.13 129.68 
Panel F Ever Worked While Enrolled Earnings While Enrolled 
Participate in Federal Loan Program 0.002 0.008 55.45 130.61 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (80.70) (95.48) 
Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 0.57 2,690.73 
N 206,255 206,255 206,255 206,255 
Demo. & Institutional Controls 
 
X 
 
X 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses and are cluster bootstrapped at the college level. Outcome means are for students 
who do not have access to loans. All regressions include year and college fixed effects. Demographic and institutional 
controls include age, race/ethnicity, gender, EFC, indicator on in-state residency, fraction of quarters employed prior to 
entry, county unemployment rate, and expenditures on scholarships, academic support, and student services. 
*** <0.01 **<0.05 *<0.10 
     
 
 
loan program. However, the difference in dollar amounts of grant aid students received before 
and after the institutional opt out is not statistically significant. Without controlling for student 
demographics and time-varying institutional measures, students with loan access received $50 
less in grant aid. With the inclusion of controls, students received $39 more. In general, these 
findings suggest that the loss in loan amounts is not fully being replaced by grants. Students 
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enrolling after an institution opted out lost the ability to borrow as much as $368 and lost an 
average of $39 through the combination of federal, state, and institution grant aid programs.  
Table 2.4 also displays whether there was a difference before and after the switch in loan 
policy for federal (panel C), state (panel D), and institutional (panel E) grant aid programs. The 
results are not statistically significant for any of the three grant aid programs. I do, however, find 
that Pell-eligible students with loan access were 1 percentage point more likely to obtain a 
federal grant and received $60 more than Pell-eligible students without loan access. For state and 
institution grant programs, the findings show a similar pattern: Pell-eligible students with loan 
access were less likely to receive grant aid (less than 1 percentage point) and the dollar amount 
was smaller by $7 and $9. 
Regarding the relationship between access to federal loans and employment, the results 
indicate that colleges’ loan policy has a positive influence on Pell-eligible students’ employment 
decisions while enrolled in school, but the results are not statistically significant. Students having 
access to loans were less than 1 percent more likely to work and earned $131 more while 
enrolled. Taking aside the statistical insignificance of the results, the positive findings associated 
with loan access are still surprising. One would expect that students without loan access would 
be more likely to work. But the findings on employment are consistent with previous research. 
Boushey (2005) found that 84 percent of undergraduates who had loans at four year institutions, 
be it not-for-profit or public, had a job while enrolled, compared to 67 percent of undergraduates 
with no loans at not-for-profit colleges and 78 percent of undergraduates without loans at public 
colleges. 
Next, I investigate the effect of participating in the Stafford loan program and loan 
borrowing on Pell-eligible students’ enrollment intensity. The following results come from the 
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OLS estimation (does not include the instrument), the reduced-form equation, and the second 
stage equation. Results in Table 2.5 display that students with federal loan access have higher 
enrollment intensity during their first year compared to students with no loan access. The 
reduced form estimates indicate that the ability to borrow a federal loan increases the number of 
credits attempted by 1.4 credits and is significant at the 5 percent level. Though the difference is 
statistically insignificant, the number of credits completed for students with access to federal 
loans is higher by two-thirds of a credit (column 5, panel A).  
Columns 3 and 6 in panel A for Table 2.5 display the effects of actual loan borrowing on 
credits attempted and completed. These results come from the second stage equation (IV model). 
The point estimates are larger than the reduced form estimates (columns 2 and 5, panel A) 
because they have been scaled up by the inverse of the first-stage equation (from Table 2, 
column 2 in panel A). The findings do suggest a positive effect on 1st year credits attempted (an 
increase of 18.5 credits) and is significant at the 5 percent level. For credits completed, the 
estimate is positive (an increase of 10 credits), but is not statistically significant. This suggests 
that loan borrowing may increase students’ enrollment intensity at the beginning of a term or 
academic year, but does not increase the number of credits completed. Assuming that students 
enroll for 3 semesters in the academic year, these results would suggest that Pell-eligible students 
who borrow attempt 6 credits more a semester, yet only compete 3 credits more.  
In terms of full-time enrollment (panel B), I find that Pell-eligible students with loan 
access or who borrow a loan are more likely to be enrolled full-time in their first year, but only 
the estimates on the probability of being enrolled full-time for at least 2 semesters are significant. 
The reduced form estimate suggests an increase of 4 percentage points for Pell-eligible students 
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with loan access and an increase of 52 percentage points for Pell-eligible students who borrowed 
a loan.  
To ascertain whether loan access and borrowing affected students’ course selection, I 
compared the number of credits in math and science courses, which are considered to be more 
rigorous courses that require more time in and out of the classroom. As panel C illustrates, there 
are significant differences in patterns of enrollment in these courses. When an institution 
participated in the federal loan program, Pell-eligible students attempted and completed 
approximately a quarter of a credit more in match and science courses. For Pell-eligible students 
who borrowed a loan, there was an increase of almost 4 credits attempted and completed.  
 For outcomes on degree completion, the results suggest that participating in the Stafford 
loan program did not significantly affect Pell-eligible students’ degree attainment and transfer to 
a 4-year institution. In panel A of Table 2.6, I examine the likelihood that students received an 
Associate’s degree within 3 years of entry. The reduced form estimate is positive at 1.2 
percentage points. For the IV model, students who borrow are 20 percentage points more likely 
to graduate, but the difference is not statistically significant. In terms of transfer to a 4-year 
institution (panel B, Table 6), the findings are also statistically insignificant, but indicate that the 
difference in transfer rates within 4 years is positive. Consequently, the findings imply that a 
community college’s participation in the federal loan program did not significantly affect the 
rates at which Pell-eligible students completed their Associate’s and continued their studies at 4-
year institutions.  
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Table 2.6. IV Estimates - Effect of Loan Borrowing on College Completion 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A Obtain AA with 3 years of entry 
  OLS Reduced Form IV 
Borrowed a Loan 0.001 
 
0.204 
 
(0.005) 
 
(0.167) 
Outcome Mean for Non-Borrowers 0.09 
 
0.09 
Participate in Federal Loan Program 
 
0.012 
 
  
(0.008) 
 Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 
 
0.08 
 N 132,147 132,147 132,147 
Panel B Transfer to 4yr within 4 years of entry 
 
OLS Reduced Form IV 
Borrowed a Loan 0.061 
 
0.038 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.166) 
Outcome Mean for Non-Borrowers 0.20 
 
0.20 
Participate in Federal Loan Program 
 
0.002 
 
  
(0.008) 
 Outcome Mean for No Loan Access 
 
0.19 
 N 138,017 138,017 138,017 
Notes: See notes in Table 2.5. Samples consist of Pell-eligible students who enrolled before the 2007-08 academic 
year. 
*** <0.01 **<0.05 *<0.10    
     
 
 
2.7.2. Results by Subgroups 
 
A change in loan policy is likely to differentially affect subgroups of students. For 
example, traditionally aged students (less than 24 years of age) are likely to have different 
educational goals than non-traditional students (over 25 years of age) (Cohen & Brawer, 2008). 
Also, students have different levels of financial constraints, as some are likely to receive 
financial support from family members and will have a lower level of financial need. In Table 
2.7, I examine outcomes across subgroups and employ the same model specifications as above 
on each group – students less than 24 years of age, older than 24 years of age, White, Black, 
male, and female. Column 1 in Table 2.7 contains the same coefficients from columns 2 and 4 in 
Table 2.4, columns 3 and 6 in Table 2.5, and column 3 in Table 2.6. Panel A consists of the 
reduced form estimates on financial aid and panel B consists of the IV estimates on enrollment 
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Table 2.7. Effects of Participating in the Federal Loan Program & Borrowing, by 
Subgroups 
  Full Sample Age<24 Age>=24 White Black Male Female 
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Reduced Form Estimates 
       Borrowed a student loan  0.076*** 0.061*** 0.098*** 0.058*** 0.104*** 0.074*** 0.077*** 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.024) (0.010) (0.031) (0.015) (0.019) 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
       Student loan amount  367.61*** 240.18*** 546.08*** 272.71*** 513.86*** 350.27*** 375.18*** 
 
(101.50) (61.83) (162.73) (65.05) (168.88) (88.66) (108.78) 
 
6.19 6.60 5.66 7.87 5.02 7.57 5.51 
       Received Grant  -0.006** -0.009** -0.003* -0.009*** -0.002 -0.006* -0.006*** 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
       Grant amount  39.40 9.24 32.12 -7.33 47.40 24.45 35.43 
 
(108.84) (130.79) (102.72) (103.76) (120.85) (146.54) (100.94) 
 
2,857.75 3,174.53 2,450.96 2,816.55 2,844.66 2,787.77 2,891.79 
       Ever worked while enrolled 0.008 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.017* 0.020 0.002 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015) (0.012) (0.009) (0.013) (0.010) 
 
0.57 0.63 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.51 0.60 
       Earnings while enrolled  130.61 74.24 188.33 134.34 148.87 228.70* 86.72 
 
(95.48) (49.12) (166.19) (103.22) (114.08) (128.96) (88.24) 
 
2,690.73 2,285.57 3,211.00 2,683.58 2,707.69 2,411.38 2,826.63 
Panel B: IV Estimates           
Credits Attempted  18.525** 28.117** 10.471* 26.418** 12.717 27.361*** 14.821* 
 
(8.157) (11.479) (5.549) (10.348) (7.886) (10.136) (7.869) 
 
16.46 17.27 15.37 17.51 14.95 16.80 16.28 
       Credits Completed  9.609 13.465 6.040 15.901 6.170 16.294 6.600 
 
(11.252) (16.514) (7.200) (13.738) (10.338) (13.327) (10.677) 
 
13.33 13.93 12.54 14.75 11.40 13.87 13.05 
        Math & Science Credits  3.943** 6.090** 1.836** 6.661** 1.314 3.779* 3.998** 
Attempted (1.778) (2.960) (0.926) (3.063) (0.937) (1.977) (1.809) 
 
1.08 1.38 0.68 1.46 0.55 1.09 1.08 
       Math & Science Credits  3.729** 5.771* 1.743* 6.467** 1.146 3.635* 3.759** 
Completed (1.806) (3.062) (0.927) (3.108) (0.948) (2.003) (1.803) 
 
1.03 1.31 0.65 1.40 0.51 1.03 1.03 
       Obtain AA within 3 years  0.204 0.234 0.206 0.184 0.162 -0.086 0.309 
of entry (0.167) (0.180) (0.268) (0.272) (0.295) (0.246) (0.222) 
 
0.09 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.10 
        Transfer to 4yr within 4 years 0.038 0.069 0.044 -0.074 0.168 0.013 0.028 
of entry (0.166) (0.243) (0.182) (0.208) (0.323) (0.294) (0.183) 
 
0.20 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.23 0.19 0.21 
       Sample Size 206,255 116,407 89,848 100,655 84,793 69,986 136,269 
Notes: Each row and column represents a separate regression. Panel A consists of the reduced form estimates and 
Panel B consists of the instrumental variable estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses and are cluster 
bootstrapped at the institution level. In Panel A, means for students who do not have loan access are in italics. In 
Panel B, means for students who did not borrow a loan are in italics. All regressions include college and year fixed 
effects and demographic and institution controls. *** <0.01 **<0.05 *<0.10 
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intensity and degree completion. The standard errors appear below each coefficient, cluster 
bootstrapped at the college level; the means of the dependent variable for students who did not 
have access to loans (in panel A) or did not borrow (in panel B) are in italics. 
Similar to previous results, I find that access to Stafford loans significantly increases Pell-
eligible students’ likelihood of borrowing and their loan amounts across all subgroups. While the 
results form the entire analytic sample showed a 7.6 percentage point increase in borrowing and 
a $368 increase in loan amounts, the difference in borrowing and loan amounts is even larger for 
particular subgroups. For non-traditional students, access to federal loans is associated with a 10-
percentage point increase in borrowing and the loan amount increases $546. For Black students, 
participation in federal loans increased loan amounts by $514.  
Across all subgroups, the share of Pell-eligible students enrolling before the community 
college opted out were less likely to receive a grant, yet the dollar amount of grants they receive 
is higher than students without loan access. The only group that received less grant aid before the 
switch in loan policy was white Pell-eligible students. For Black students, the before and after 
difference in the share of students receiving a grant is statistically insignificant. However, Black 
students with loan access were 1.7 percentage points more likely to work while enrolled, an 
estimate that is significant at the 10 percent level. 
Though estimates from Table 2.5 showed that Pell-eligible students who borrow a loan 
attempted more credits in their first year, disaggregating results by subgroups reveals the 
estimated differences in credits attempted is even larger for particular subgroups. For example, 
for students younger than 24 years old, the difference is 28 credits. The difference in credits 
completed is also positive across all subgroups, but statistically insignificant. For attempted and 
completed math and science credits, the results are positive across subgroups, and, except for 
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Black students, is statistically significant at the 5 or 10 percent level. Similar to the results in 
Table 2.6, the share of Pell-eligible students obtaining an Associate’s within 3 years of entry and 
transfer to a 4-year college within 4-years of entry is statistically insignificant across subgroups. 
However, the results indicate that the difference is negative for particular subgroups. For 
example, male students borrowing a loan were 8.6 percentage points less likely to receive an 
Associate’s. White students who borrow were 7.4 percentage points less likely to transfer to a 4-
year institution.  
2.7.3. Robustness Check 
 
 One concern with the main results is the sample includes only students who were eligible 
for a Pell-grant. Limiting the sample to this particular sample hinders the ability to make 
inferences for SCCS system as a whole. For my first robustness check, I run my estimations 
again using the full sample of financial aid recipients, which also includes students who were 
ineligible for a Pell grant.  
 The results in Table 2.8 are similar to the main results presented in Table 2.4. Access to 
loans increases the probability of borrowing by 9.5 percentage points and the average loan 
amount increases $436 (or $4,589, conditional on borrowing). Consistent with my previous 
results, students enrolling when the community college participated in the federal loan program 
were 2.4 percentage points less likely receive a grant. The average dollar amount of grants for 
these students is also $22 less than students without loan access.  
Panel B in Table 2.8 displays the results on enrollment intensity and degree completion. 
Again, the findings are consistent with the main results. More specifically, financial aid 
recipients who borrowed a loan attempted 17 more credits than non-borrowers, with the 
difference being significant at the 1 percent level. The difference in credits completed is also 
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positive, but like the main results, is not statistically significant. Students borrowing a loan also 
attempted and completed 3 more credits in math and science courses. Results on degree 
completion and transfer to a 4-year are positive, but not statistically significant.     
 
Table 2.8. Robustness Check  
Effects of Loan Participation & Borrowing on Aid, Enrollment, & College Completion 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Reduced Form Estimates      
 
Borrowed a 
Loan Loan Amount 
Received Any 
Grant Grant Amount 
Worked 
While 
Enrolled 
Earnings While 
Enrolled 
!       Participate in Federal 
Loan Program 0.095*** 436.07*** -0.024*** -22.03 0.009 146.43 
 
(0.018) (107.966) (0.005) (94.189) (0.009) (93.331) 
Outcome Mean for No 
Loan Access 0.01 8.59 1.00 2801.79 0.58 2735.49 
N 222,258 222,258 222,258 222,258 222,258 222,258 
Panel B: IV Estimates       
 
Credits 
Attempted 
Credits 
Completed 
Math & 
Science 
Credits 
Attempted 
Math & 
Science 
Credits 
Completed 
Obtain AA 
within 3 
years of 
entry 
Transfer to 4yr 
within 4 years 
of entry 
! ! ! ! ! ! !Borrowed a Loan 16.550*** 8.777 3.173** 2.976** 0.207 0.045 
 
(6.336) (8.781) (1.244) (1.258) (0.129) (0.122) 
Outcome Mean for Non-
Borrowers 16.69 13.60 1.14 1.09 0.10 0.21 
N 222,258 222,258 222,258 222,258 140,423 146,863 
Notes: Each row and column represents a separate regression. Panel A consists of the reduced form estimates and 
Panel B consists of the instrumental variable estimates. Standard errors are in parentheses and are cluster 
bootstrapped at the institution level. In Panel A, means for students who do not have loan access are in italics. In 
Panel B, means for students who did not borrow a loan are in italics. All regressions include college and year fixed 
effects and demographic and institution controls.  
*** <0.01 **<0.05 *<0.10!
! ! ! ! ! 
 
 
2.8. Conclusion 
 
Over the past two decades, students loans have become a popular form of aid helping 
individuals pay for a postsecondary degree (College Board, 2013). As a result, more students are 
graduating with higher debt loads, and the rising national student loan default rate reflects their 
struggles to repay what they borrow (Hillman, 2014). Should a certain share of former students 
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default on their government-backed loans, the federal government sanctions these colleges and 
prohibits them from providing any federal aid to currently enrolled students. In response, 
colleges are restricting their students’ access to federal loan as a proactive approach to protect 
their eligibility to disburse federal financial aid. The unintended consequence of this 
accountability mechanism may dramatically reduce access to federal loans if the number of 
institutions opting out of the program continues to increase.  
 The findings from this paper suggest that providing Pell-eligible students with the 
opportunity to borrow has positive effects on the number of credits students’ attempt in their first 
year. Loan borrowing also increases the number of credits completed, degree completion, and 
transfer to a 4-year institution, although the results are not statistically significant. More 
importantly, Pell-eligible students borrowing a loan are have a higher enrollment intensity in 
STEM related courses, which are in alignment with occupations that are considered to be in 
demand and offer higher pay in the workforce. Given the positive effects for students, 
policymakers may want to consider revising accountability rules so that metrics on loan use and 
default rates do not create an incentive for institutions to opt of the program and limit the ability 
for students to borrow loans. 
Furthermore, results from this paper suggest that colleges choosing to exclude federal 
loans from students’ financial aid packages should have practices in place to help students 
financially and academically. One particular federal, state, or institution aid program – or a 
combination of all three – will not necessarily cover the amount of aid lost when opting out of 
the federal student loan program; institutions may need to develop financial aid programs to 
supplement existing grant aid. Institutions should also be aware that students might reduce their 
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enrollment intensity in the absence of loans, and they may want to have academic resources 
available to ensure that students are able to complete their degree.  
It is important to note that the share of SCCS students borrowing a loan is lower than 
national estimates. Nationally, roughly 17 percent of community college students borrow, 
compared to 3 percent at SCCS. Possible reasons provided by SCSS financial aid administrators 
for the low borrowing rates are the extremely low tuition rates and a combination of aid 
programs that can cover directs costs for students with extremely high need. Additionally, the 
low loan take-up also reflects the high share of community colleges that prohibit students from 
borrowing; only 35 percent of SCCS community colleges participated in the federal loan 
program in 2009-10. These are important issues to consider when thinking about the 
generalizability of these results to other contexts. More specifically, this paper is not able to fully 
examine the impact of losing loan eligibility for students who are just above Pell-eligibility 
threshold nor for students who attend highly priced institutions, which are two groups of students 
who depend on using loans to pay for college. If the results from this paper provide any 
indication, the impact of losing loan eligibility for these students may be even larger.  
 Though the analysis in this paper offers insight into the student-level consequences of 
community colleges’ decision in whether or not to participation in the Stafford loan program, 
additional research is needed surrounding institutional decisions to not participate in the federal 
loan program – and on the effects of loan access more generally. At the institutional level, further 
research is necessary to determine whether other factors besides the cohort default rate contribute 
to institutions’ decision to opt out and how accountability mechanisms could be revised to 
reduced or eliminate federal loan access (or lack thereof) on college access and educational 
outcomes. Information on employment and private loan use is limited with the SCCS datasets. 
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More research needs to examine how the institutional decision not to offer federal loans lead 
students to rely on working while or rely on private loans with higher interest rates and less 
flexible repayment plans. The national dialogue is currently dominated with concerns over rising 
debt levels, but before limiting access to loans is embraced as the solution, it is important to 
understand the extent to which federal loans are contributing to the problem and the effects a 
reduction in loan access would have on educational outcomes.  
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Appendix 2.A. Theoretical Framework 
 
This paper is guided by two theories that help to explain how institutional-level decisions 
to opt out of the federal loan program affect student-level educational outcomes. At the 
institutional level, I draw on principal-agent theory to understand why an institution would opt 
out of the federal student loan program. At the student level, I utilize the time allocation strand of 
human capital theory to illuminate how students’ inability to take out federal loans – resulting 
from the institution’s decision to opt out – may condition their educational trajectories in ways 
that affect their progress toward degree completion and other outcomes. I developed this 
framework using insights from the aforementioned interviews with financial aid administrators 
and it assumes that institutions do not substitute the loss of loans for another form of financial 
aid created specifically to cover the loss. 
2.A.1 Principal-Agent Theory 
 Under the principal-agent theory, an agent acts on behalf of, or carries out a designed task 
for, the principal (Macho-Stadler & Perez-Castrillo, 2001; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). The 
relationship between the two parties is “governed by a contract specifying what the agent should 
do and what the principal must do in return” (Perrow, 1986, p. 224). This theory assumes that the 
principal designs the contract and then offers it to the agent, who then decides whether or not to 
accept the terms of the contract. Once the agent agrees to the contract, the agent is to carry out 
 92 
 
the actions as specified in the contract and is expected to work in the best interests of the 
principal.   
 In the case of community colleges and the federal loan program, the federal government 
is the principal. The government created the loan program to increase college access and 
completion by providing students with the financial assistance to make college affordable. The 
government entrusted administration of the loans to the educational institutions – the agents – 
and relies on the colleges to disburse the aid in a manner that furthers the goals of the program. 
The program guidelines – the contract – stipulate the requirements to which colleges must adhere 
and the mechanisms by which the federal government monitors colleges’ participation.  
 According to principal-agent theory, however, problems can arise after the parties have 
agreed upon the terms of the contract. Because agents are trying to maximize their own utility, 
they sometimes make decisions that are pursuant to their own interests rather than the 
principal’s. This misalignment is referred to as “shirking” (Lane, 2012). To prevent shirking, the 
principal can use incentives or penalties to ensure that the agent acts according to the principal’s 
goals (Laffont & Martimort, 2002). As mentioned previously, one mechanism that the U.S. 
Department of Education utilizes is the cohort default rate. If a college’s default rate exceeds 30 
or 40 percent, the college is sanctioned by the federal government and prohibited from 
participating in federal financial aid programs. Since it is in the best interests of community 
colleges to avoid having a CDR that threatens their ability to provide students with federal grants 
such as the Pell, this policy was implemented to ensure that community colleges administer loans 
in a manner that furthers the goals of the program. 
As the principal-agent theory highlights, however, if the incentives or penalties are 
ambiguous or do not align with the contracted goals, a disconnect can arise and lead to further 
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shirking by agents (Laffont & Martimort, 2002).  The CDR threshold and penalties create – 
perhaps inadvertently – an incentive for community colleges to opt out of the federal loan 
program entirely in order to maintain eligibility for other federal aid programs. Doing so protects 
the interests of the community colleges, but detracts from the federal government’s efforts to 
provide financial aid to increase college access and completion. Lack of access to loans may 
prolong time to degree completion or increase dropout rates, and directing students to private 
lenders can, as discussed earlier, be detrimental to students’ long-term financial situation. 
2.A.2 Time Allocation 
Whereas principal-agent theory offers insight into why colleges choose to opt out of the 
federal loan program, human capital theory and time allocation help explain the effects of this 
decision on students’ educational outcomes. Human capital theory is the most common approach 
employed by higher education researchers to analyze students’ decision-making behavior in 
relation to college enrollment, completion, and financing (Long, 2007; Paulsen & Toutkoushian, 
2008).  Attending college is viewed as an investment in one’s human capital because it generally 
increases individuals’ productive capacities and provides them with pecuniary and nonpecuniary 
benefits (Becker, 1993). One strand of human capital theory is Becker’s (1965) time allocation 
model. Becker’s original model explains household decision-making behaviors by treating 
households as producers and consumers seeking to maximize their utility function, which is 
derived from the production and consumption of commodities. Later, Becker (1993) expanded 
his original model to include investment in human capital. Becker suggested that the amount of 
time an individual attending college spends on leisure and work is inversely proportion to the 
time spent on school-related activities. Accordingly, time spent on activities that produce human 
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capital, such as studying and other school-related tasks, is negatively related to time spent on 
leisure and working; as leisure and work time increase, schooling time decreases.  
In the context of this study, Becker’s time allocation model helps explain students’ 
response to loan access, or lack thereof. A student’s time allocation may not only be determined 
by personal factors, but also by exogenous factors such as the availability of loans (Kim, Kim, 
DesJardins, & McCall, in press). The availability of loans and the use of them to pay for college 
may affect students’ college academics and performance. For example, for students with limited 
financial resources, deciding how to finance their college education involves tradeoffs. Without 
access to a loan or other forms of financial aid, financially constrained students are likely to 
allocate a larger portion of their time to paid employment. In order to pay for college, these 
students may enroll in fewer credits each semester or reduce the duration of their education. 
Alternatively, the receipt of financial aid, such as a loan, provides students an option for 
financing their education that does not involve reducing the amount of time spent on educational 
activities. By alleviating financial constraints without directing time away from class, studying, 
and other school-related activities, loans may facilitate faster time to degree completion and 
improved outcomes post-graduation. Consequently, community colleges’ decision to opt out of 
the federal loan program and limit their students’ options for financing their education could 
affect key student-level outcomes such as enrollment intensity, time to degree, and dropout rate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
Appendix 2.B. Supporting Figures for SCCS Loan Participation 
 
Figure 2.5. Unemployment Rate 
 
Notes: The vertical line represents the quarter the community college opted out of the 
federal loan program. The academic year the institution switched loan policy is in 
parentheses. 
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (2014) 
 
Figure 2.6. Share of SCCS Students Receiving Financial Aid 
 
Notes: Graph illustrates the share of first-time students receiving financial aid in each 
academic year. Institutions observed as never offering loans or always offering loans 
are “no loan policy switch” colleges. The 15 community colleges that offered loans 
and then switched to not offering are “switch loan policy” colleges.  
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
0
5
10
15
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20
-2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20 -2
0
-1
5
-1
0 -5 0 5 10 15 20
Inst. 1 (2009-10) Inst. 2 (2002-03) Inst. 3 (2002-03) Inst. 4 (2007-08)
Inst. 5 (2004-05) Inst. 6 (2007-08) Inst. 7 (2006-07) Inst. 8 (2002-03)
Inst. 9 (2003-04) Inst. 10 (2002-03) Inst. 11 (2005-06) Inst. 12 (2008-09)
Inst. 13 (2003-04) Inst. 14 (2008-09) Inst. 15 (2003-04)
County Unemployment Rate State Unemployment Rate
Un
em
plo
ym
en
t R
at
e 
(%
)
Quarter Relative to Loan Policy Switch
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
.6
Sh
ar
e 
Re
ce
ivi
ng
 A
id
20
01
-0
2
20
02
-0
3
20
03
-0
4
20
04
-0
5
20
05
-0
6
20
06
-0
7
20
07
-0
8
20
08
-0
9
20
09
-1
0
Cohort Academic Year
No Loan Policy Switch Switch Loan Policy
 96 
 
Appendix 2.C. Additional Identifying Assumptions 
 
 To evaluate whether the instrument on participation in the federal loan program is valid, I 
discuss further how the instrument meets additional instrumental assumptions proposed by 
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996):  
The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) requires that an individual’s 
treatment status cannot influence other individuals’ outcomes (i.e. spillover effects). One 
plausible threat to this assumption is for students who enrolled prior to the switch in loan policy: 
institutions could grandfather these students under the old loan policy and allow them to continue 
to receive federal loans. This potentially leads to peer interactions between grandfathered 
students and incoming students who cannot borrow a federal loans. Incoming students without 
the ability to borrow could respond to the knowledge that some students are getting loans. 
However, the share of students being grandfathered is fairly small. For the 15 community college 
switching their loan policy, 7 percent of financial aid recipients borrowed a federal loan a year 
prior to change in loan policy, yet only .3 percent borrowed a loan the in the 1st year opting out 
of the Stafford loan program. Given the small share of students being grandfathered, it hard to 
believe that there would be some spillover effects to occur.   
The stable unit treatment value assumption also requires that the treatment is to be 
consistent across all treated groups. To fulfill this assumption means that all treated students 
receive the same loan amount. Because of federal financial aid guidelines, students’ rarely 
receive the same loan amount – amounts vary by students’ financial need, college, and academic 
year. To address this concern, I control for students’ EFC and other need-based financial aid, 
such as grants. In addition, I measure treatment status as a dichotomous variable rather than a 
dollar amount. This allows for estimation of student loan receipt on educational outcomes.   
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 The next two assumptions are the good as random and the exclusion restriction 
assumptions. The big threat to these assumptions relates to the share of students who transfer to 
another community college as a response to the change in loan policy. For example, credit 
constrained students who want to increase their enrollment intensity and need a loan to pay for 
college would likely transfer to a college that does participate in the federal loan program. Figure 
2.7 displays the share of students who transfer to another college in their 1st and 2nd years of 
enrollment. As Figure 2.7 demonstrates, the transfer rate is fairly small at the 15 community 
colleges, less than 4 percent in the first year and less than 8 percent in the second year. Figure 2.7 
also illustrates that there was not a dramatic increase or decrease in the share of students 
transferring after the change in loan policy. In addition, I use Equation 1 to determine whether 
loan policy was correlated with transfer rates. For transfer in the 1st and 2nd year, there were no 
significant differences between the two periods. The difference for transfer in the 1st year was 
0.001 (0.001) and 0.003 (0.004) for transfer in the 2nd year. Given the low transfer rates and 
insignificant transfer rate differences before and after the change in loan policy, the violation of 
the exclusion restriction assumption is low.  
The last assumption, monotonicity, requires that the instrument pushes the treatment 
variable in one direction. For this paper, it means that students borrow a federal loan when 
attending a community college that is participating in the Stafford loan program, or students do 
not borrow a loan when the community college opts out. This assumption cannot be directly 
testable. However, it is very plausible to hold because it can be expected that they only way a 
student can receive a federal loan is through the community college’s loan participation.    
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Figure 2.7. Share of Students Transferring in 1st and 2nd Years of Enrollment 
 
Notes: Graph illustrates the share of first-time students transferring to a different 
community college in their 1st year or at the start of their 2nd year of enrollment. The 
vertical line represents the academic year the community college opted out of the federal 
loan program. The academic year the institution switched loan policy is in parentheses. 
 
Appendix 2.D. Supporting Figures for Identifying Assumptions 
 
Figure 2.8. Map of SCCS Colleges, by School's Loan Participation 
 
Notes: State and county lines have been omitted and not all schools are presented to protect identity. School’s loan 
participation is based on the number of disbursements from 2001-02 to 2009-10. Institutions that never disbursed 
Stafford loans during that time period are considered “never.” Institutions that offered loans and then switched to not 
offering are “sometimes.” Institutions that always offered loans over the time period are considered “always.” 
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Figure 2.9. Share of Students Attending College in Neighboring County or Far Distance 
 
Notes: Location of student’s high school determines location to community college 
and is only available for students who reported a high school to the community 
college. The vertical line represents the academic year the community college opted 
out of the federal loan program. The academic year the institution switched loan 
policy is in parentheses. 
 
Figure 2.10. First-Time, First Year Enrollment Rates 
 
Notes: Graph illustrates the share of first-time, first year students enrolling for each 
academic year. The vertical line represents the academic year the community college opted 
out of the federal loan program. The academic year the institution switched loan policy is in 
parentheses. 
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Chapter 3. Student Aid Simplification: Looking Back and Looking 
Ahead* 
 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
Each year, 14 million households seeking federal aid for college complete a detailed 
questionnaire about their finances, the Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). With 
116 questions, the FAFSA is almost as long as IRS Form 1040 and substantially longer than 
Forms 1040EZ and 1040A. Since the majority of households use the shorter IRS forms, the 
typical household’s aid application is longer and more complicated than its federal tax return. 
Aid for college is intended to increase college attendance by reducing its price and loosening 
liquidity constraints. Economic theory, empirical evidence and common sense suggest that 
complexity in aid could undermine its ability to affect schooling decisions. 
A long-standing theoretical and experimental literature suggests that seemingly minor 
differences in program design can have profound impacts upon decision-making (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2000). A burgeoning empirical literature has demonstrated that these predictions hold 
in real-life situations such as saving for retirement (Madrian & Shea, 2001). Empirical patterns in 
the behavioral impact of aid have supported the hypothesis that complexity in the aid system 
undermines its efficacy: simple aid programs have a robust impact on college attendance, while 
traditional forms of student aid (which require a FAFSA) do not (Dynarski & Scott-Clayton, 
2006). A recent field experiment directly tested this hypothesis by randomly assigning families 
                                                
* Co-authored with Dr. Susan Dynarski and published in the National Tax Journal, vol. 65, p. 211-234. 
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to a radically simplified aid application process (Bettinger, Long, Oreopoulos, & Sanbonmatsu, 
2012). The results were striking: a simplified aid application process produced a substantial 
increase in college attendance, comparable to that induced by offering an applicant several 
thousand dollars in grant aid. Based on these results and a review of other interventions intended 
to increase college attendance, Dynarski, Hyman, and Schanzenbach (2011) calculate that 
simplifying the aid process is (by several orders of magnitude) the cheapest way to increase 
college attendance. 
Five years ago, Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) published an analysis of complexity 
in the aid system that generated considerable discussion in academic and policy circles. Over the 
next few years, complexity in the aid system drew the attention of the media, advocacy groups, 
presidential candidates, the National Economic Council, and the Council of Economic Advisers. 
A flurry of legislative and agency activity around aid simplification followed. In this article, we 
provide a retrospective of what has changed in the aid application process, what has not, and the 
possibilities for future reform. 
3.2. Background: A Brief Overview of Aid for College 
 
In this section we briefly describe how the financial aid system functions in the United 
States and how it evolved into its current shape.33 Two programs represent the bulk of federal aid 
to college students: the Pell Grant and the Stafford Loan. Both are distributed through the “need-
determination” process, in which extensive data about a student's resources and expenses are 
used to estimate his or her “need” for aid.  The FAFSA is required for all federal grants and 
loans. Most state aid and school scholarships also require the FAFSA. Some colleges require an 
additional aid application. The FAFSA collects basic demographics (e.g., name, social security 
                                                
33 Some of this material is drawn from Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006), where this topic is covered in greater 
detail. 
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number, citizenship, date of birth) as well as detailed information about the student's and parents' 
income, assets, and expenditures.  
 Once the FAFSA is submitted, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) computes the 
Expected Family Contribution (EFC), an estimate of how much the family can pay out of pocket 
for college. “Need” is defined as the difference between the cost of attendance (e.g., tuition, fees, 
books, and living expenses) and this family contribution. Using the EFC, colleges personalize a 
package of grants and loans for each student, which they then mail out in award letters, typically 
in March and April.  Only upon receiving these award letters do students know how much 
college will cost for the upcoming academic school year. 
 The current aid application has its historical roots in a form developed by a group of 
private colleges in the 1950’s. The colleges, under the auspices of the College Board, worked 
together to establish a common method for assigning aid so that they could prevent competitive 
bidding for students. They established a common aid application (the Parents' Confidential 
Statement) and formed the College Scholarship Service (CSS) to process the application (Duffy 
& Goldberg, 1998; Wilkinson, 2005). The form was intended to measure income and wealth at 
quite high levels, reflecting the student composition of the founding colleges (e.g., Harvard). The 
form asked, for example, about the model of the family car. At the time that this first aid form 
was designed, there was no federal aid application to work from, since the Pell Grant and student 
loan programs had yet to be created. The private institutions were the first architects of aid in the 
US, and their imprint is clear in the current system.  
 In 1973, the most ambitious aid program was established: the federal Pell Grant, first 
known as the Basic Education Opportunity Grant (BEOG). The Pell was introduced in a context 
of small, scattered state and institutional aid programs, which often had their own applications. 
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Concerned about the multiple forms faced by students seeking aid for college, a group of 
financial aid stakeholders came together in 1975 as the National Task Force on Student Aid 
Programs, or the Keppel Task Force. The group succeeded in getting cooperation from 
institutions, states and the federal government in the development of a common application for 
student aid. A common aid application need not have implied a common formula for defining a 
student's aid eligibility, any more than the Common Application now used by 456 colleges 
defines a single standard for college admission.34 However, as part of the initiative that created 
the common form, the various players also agreed upon a common formula, initially known as 
the Uniform Methodology and now known as the Federal Methodology.  
 The model established in 1975 persists today: a common application for collecting 
extensive data about a student's finances  (the FAFSA) linked to a common formula (the Federal 
Methodology) for translating these data into a metric of a student's ability to pay (the Expected 
Family Contribution). Federal, state and institutional aid programs use the EFC to determine aid 
eligibility.   
The contents of the FAFSA and the definition of the EFC are controlled by the federal 
government. In its periodic reauthorizations of the 1965 Higher Education Act, Congress makes 
decisions about aid, which are then implemented by ED. ED has considerable discretion in its 
implementation of Congressional intent. ED's decisions about how to implement a given 
directive can add complexity to the aid process. For example, in 2008, Congress directed ED to 
allow homeless applicants to complete a shortened application. In response, ED added three 
questions to the FAFSA that elicit whether a student has been defined as homeless by a list of 
state and local agencies. This is a case in which a Congressional directive to simplify the process 
for a minority of applicants led to an increase in complexity for all applicants. 
                                                
34 A list of colleges using the Common Application can be found at http://www.commonapp.org.  
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3.3. Complexity in the Aid System: Critiques and Responses 
 
In 2005, the Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, a Congressionally 
authorized standing committee, released a report that critiqued complexity in the financial aid 
system (Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance, 2005). The committee concluded 
that:  
 “Millions of students and adult learners who aspire to college are overwhelmed by the 
 complexity of student aid. Uncertainty and confusion robs them of its significant benefits. 
 Rather than promote access, student aid often creates a series of barriers - a gauntlet that  
 the poorest students must run to get to college.” (p. i) 
  
Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) quantified complexity in the aid system. That article showed 
that the FAFSA rivals the IRS tax forms in length, with more questions than the 1040EZ, 1040A 
or even the 1040.  That article also demonstrated that there is very little tradeoff between 
simplicity and targeting in the federal aid programs, since the majority of questions on the 
FAFSA have little marginal impact on federal aid eligibility. A small handful of the questions — 
in particular, income and family size — account for about 80 percent of the variation in Pell 
grant eligibility. Most of the questions could therefore be removed from the FAFSA while 
maintaining the existing distribution of aid.  
 This research was cited in the 2006 report of the Commission on the Future of Higher 
Education, which had been charged by then-Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings to 
identify challenges facing the higher education system in the United States. The Commission 
called for “consolidating programs, streamlining processes, and replacing the FAFSA with a 
much shorter and simpler application (Commission on the Future of Higher Education, 2006, p. 
3) .” The analysis of Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) was developed into a policy proposal to 
streamline the aid application process and released by the Hamilton Project in 2007 (Dynarski & 
Scott-Clayton, 2007). Elements of this proposal were integrated into the platforms of several of 
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the presidential candidates, including that of Barack Obama, and ultimately were included in the 
Democratic national platform. In 2008, a working group of academics and aid officials released a 
report sounding similar themes under the auspices of the College Board (Rethinking Student Aid 
Study Group, 2008). 
 In 2007, Congress responded to the rising chorus of criticism of the aid application by 
including several simplifications in the College Cost Reduction and Access Act (CCRAA). 
These provisions did not take effect until the 2009–10 academic year. CCRAA eliminated 
portions of the FAFSA, including Worksheet A, which had asked about untaxed income. But 
CCRAA also imposed new requirements for determining if a student was an independent, 
thereby adding questions to the FAFSA. CCRAA also expanded the number of students who 
automatically qualified for a family contribution of zero (an “auto-zero EFC”). Before CCRAA, 
households with annual income below $20,000 were eligible for the auto-zero EFC; CCRAA 
raised that threshold to $30,000 (U.S. Department of Education, 2008c).   
 Upon Barack Obama's election, ED, the National Economic Council, and the Council of 
Economic Advisers began working on efforts to streamline the aid process, releasing in 
September 2009 a report devoted to the topic (Council of Economic Advisors, 2009) that drew 
extensively upon Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006), Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2007) and the 
report of the Rethinking Student Aid Study Group (2008). During the summer of 2009, 
Congressional committees developed ambitious legislation to streamline the aid form. Most of 
these provisions were eventually discarded in last-minute negotiations, which were dominated by 
legislation to overhaul student loans and health care.  
 Since this burst of Congressional activity, the most significant changes to the aid system 
have been made via administrative authority. ED has worked to simplify the online FAFSA, 
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eliminating repetitive questions (e.g., applicants had previously been asked for their age as well 
as their birth date) and introducing “skip logic” that allows students and parents to answer fewer 
questions based on their responses to screening questions (U.S. Department of Education, 
2010b).    
 In the spring of 2010, some online applicants were for the first time allowed to 
automatically transfer their IRS data into the FAFSA application. This process saves applicants 
from having to collect tax documents and enter items manually. This in turn prevents data-entry 
errors, which cause applications to be flagged for revision and resubmission.35 This represented a 
major administrative breakthrough, since IRS had steadfastly refused to allow any such 
connection of data from the two agencies, citing both privacy concerns and a longstanding 
resistance to using tax data for any purpose other than tax collection. Both of these issues were 
resolved to IRS's satisfaction by having applicants personally log into IRS servers while filling in 
the FAFSA, with data items then copied over to the aid form via the applicant's web browser.  
 This effort to streamline the online application was paired with an ongoing campaign to 
move applicants away from the paper FAFSA. ED stopped accepting bulk orders for the paper 
FAFSA, which had been placed annually by colleges, high schools, college coaching programs, 
libraries, and community agencies. This meant, for example, that students were no longer able to 
go to their high school guidance counselor to get a copy of the FAFSA, but had to instead order 
one from ED. Paper applications dropped sharply, from 696,000 filed by undergraduates in 
2006–07 to 500,000 the following year (U.S. Department of Education, 2008a, 2009b). In 2009–
10, only 94,000 paper FAFSA applications were submitted (U.S. Department of Education, 
2011a).  
                                                
35 ED has for a number of years sent FAFSAs to IRS to have them checked for errors in income and tax data. Upon 
discovering an inconsistency, IRS flags the application, which ED then returns to the applicant for revision. IRS 
does not specify (to ED or the applicant) which answer is in error. 
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 In another important development, completing the FAFSA online (but not on paper) now 
produces an immediate estimate of federal aid eligibility, just as completing a 1040 produces an 
estimate of tax liability. Previously, applicants received no notification of aid eligibility until 
they received an award letter from the aid offices of the colleges to which they had been 
admitted.  
3.4. What Has Changed? What Has Not Changed? 
 
We have just described quite a bit of legislative and agency activity. What has been the 
net effect on the applicant experience? Is applying for aid less of a hurdle than it was in 2006?  
3.4.1. FAFSA Still Longer than Typical Federal Tax Return 
 
The FAFSA still makes the typical tax return look svelte. While two dozen questions 
have been removed from the FAFSA in the past five years, another dozen have been added. As a 
result, the FAFSA now has 116 questions, compared to 127 questions five years ago.36 In Table 
3.1, we compare the 2011–12 FAFSA to its 2006–07 incarnation, as well as to the 1040, 1040A 
and 1040EZ for the 2010 tax year. The FAFSA is now slightly shorter than the 1040, at 116 and 
126 questions, respectively. In 2006, by contrast, the FAFSA was slightly longer. Since more 
than half of families with incomes in the Pell range (that is, below $50,000) fill out the 1040A or 
1040EZ,37 the shorter tax forms may be a more appropriate benchmark. The FAFSA compares 
poorly with these shorter IRS forms: the 1040EZ has 38 questions and the 1040A has 84, 
compared to the FAFSA's 116. Nine data items on the 1040EZ (44 on the 1040A) are used to 
compute tax liability, as compared to the 66 FAFSA questions used to compute aid eligibility. As 
                                                
36 Dropped questions include eight pertaining to earned income credits, additional child tax credits, welfare benefits, 
and untaxed social security benefits, two relating to veteran benefits, four pertaining to untaxed income and income 
adjustments, six calculation lines, one on planned enrollment intensity and two about the colleges to which the 
FAFSA is being forwarded. Added questions address tax credits and allowances (four questions), dependency status 
(six questions), the student's high school name and location, parents' email address, dislocated-worker status, and 
means-tested benefits. 
37 Authors' calculations using published tables in Parisi (2011).   
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was true in 2006, it is a puzzle why the aid system requires so much more data than the tax 
system to determine ability to pay. 
 
Table 3.1. Complexity of IRS Tax Forms versus FAFSA 
  1040 1040A 1040EZ FAFSA FAFSA 
  2010 2010 2010 2006–2007 2011–2012 
      
Number of pages (excluding 
instructions) 2 2 1 5 6 
      
Number of questions 126 84 38 127 116 
Answered through IRS data link     18 
      
Non-financial items      
Identifying information 6 6 6 22 24 
Demographic/family information 8 8 2 18 29 
Enrollment status/school 0 0 0 7 4 
Signature and preparer 12 12 12 8 8 
Other 1 1 1 10 7 
      
Financial items      
Earned income 1 1 1 5 5 
Other income 19 12 2 33 19 
Assets 0 0 0 6 6 
Deductions/credits/allowances 42 23 3 12 14 
Calculations from tables 21 12 6 6 0 
Withholdings, refund preferences 16 9 5 0 0 
      
Number of items required for 
computation of tax or aid 76 44 9 72 66 
      
Number words in signing statement 49 64 59 232 232 
      
Official estimate of hours to prepare      
Paper 23  9  7  1  3  
Web     1  
Notes: Counts for the FAFSA are for dependent students with two parents and include questions on required student 
and parent worksheets. Total number of questions includes sub-questions and non-numbered questions. Items such 
as name and address are counted in the same way on IRS and FAFSA forms.  
 
 
3.4.2. Official Estimate of Time to Complete FAFSA Still Implausibly Low 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, ED has increased its estimate of time needed to complete the 
paper FAFSA, from one hour to three hours: 
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 “The time required to complete the paper or PDF version of the FAFSA is estimated to be 
 three hours; the time required to complete the web version of the FAFSA, on FAFSA on 
 the Web, is estimated to be one hour and fifteen minutes; the time required to complete 
 the pre-filled web version of the FAFSA, on FAFSA on the Web, is estimated to be fifty-
 five minutes. These estimates include the time necessary to review instructions, search 
 data resources, gather the data needed, and complete and review the information 
 collection, and make copies of output documents for future reference.”38 
 
ED was roundly criticized for the implausibility of its earlier estimates, and these new, higher 
estimates still seem low. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, which mandates these time 
estimates, allows each agency to choose its own method for calculating the time costs of filling 
out federal forms, and we know of no detailed exposition of the process ED uses to generate 
these estimates. The online FAFSA consists of 19 screens, 116 questions and many pages of 
accompanying instructions. ED calculates that online FAFSA applicants spend 23 minutes 
logged in and completing the form (U.S. Department of Education, 2011d). Given their overall 
estimate of 75 minutes, this indicates ED has concluded that applicants can read the FAFSA 
instructions and gather the requisite financial documentation (including that of spouses or 
parents) in 52 minutes.  
These figures look particularly implausible when compared to the paperwork estimates of 
the IRS. The IRS estimates that it takes seven hours to complete the 1040EZ, which is a third the 
length of the FAFSA. The IRS estimates it takes 23 hours to complete the 1040, which is slightly 
longer than the FAFSA. Outside researchers who have fielded taxpayer surveys have concluded 
that even these IRS estimates are low (Blumenthal & Slemrod, 1992). No independent 
researchers have conducted a similar survey or observation of how long it takes to complete the 
FAFSA, whether on paper or online. The time is ripe for such a study.  
 
                                                
38 2012–13 FAFSA instructions, downloaded on January 2, 2012 from http://studentaid.ed.gov. 
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3.4.3. Most Applicants Can't Use FAFSA-IRS Link 
 
The ability of an applicant to link data from his 1040 to his FAFSA has great potential to 
simplify the application process. Much of the financial data needed to compute aid eligibility is 
present in the IRS data, as are many of the demographic items that the FAFSA requests. As 
discussed in Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) and Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2007), it is 
feasible to eliminate the FAFSA completely, with tax data alone used to calculate eligibility. 
As implemented, however, the IRS link falls well short of this potential. Applicants are 
allowed to import their IRS data only if they have already filed their tax return for the previous 
tax year. IRS also needs to have made these newly filed returns available to online aid applicants, 
which takes two to eight additional weeks after the return is filed. Given these constraints, it is 
virtually impossible for anyone filing under the traditional academic and tax schedules to use the 
FAFSA-IRS link. A family who files a 1040 as soon as W-2s are due in household mailboxes 
(start of February) would be eligible to use the FAFSA-IRS link sometime between mid-
February and April, while a family who files on tax day would not be able to do so until May or 
June. As can be seen in Figure 3.1, most aid applicants have submitted the FAFSA well before 
these dates.  
Why do so many aid applicants file early in the year? Because schools and aid programs 
tell them to. Colleges ask students to file FAFSAs early in the year, as do state aid programs, 
whose deadlines are listed on the FAFSA. By mid-April, the date by which an early tax filer 
could plausibly use the FAFSA-IRS link, the filing deadline has passed for fifteen state aid 
programs, including those in California (March 2) and Illinois (“as soon as possible after January 
1”). Students who want to qualify for state aid need to file even earlier than these posted 
deadlines (Steinberg, 2011), since some programs give out funds on a first-come, first-served 
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basis, with eligible candidates left empty-handed once funds are depleted. In an analysis of 
Kentucky's College Access Program Grant, we found that roughly 40 percent of eligible 
applicants received no grant because funds ran out before the filing deadline. A student who 
wants to maximize her chances of receiving aid would therefore file early, forgo the IRS match 
and manually enter her tax information. And this, indeed, is what has occurred. ED estimates that 
just 24 percent of applicants use the IRS link (U.S. Department of Education, 2011d). 
 
Figure 3.1. Month of FAFSA Submission for 2007-08 Applicants 
 
Notes: See Data Appendix for sample definition.  
 
 
 
3.4.4. Pell Has Grown More Generous and Spending Has Risen Rapidly 
 
While aid simplification has moved forward at a halting pace, spending on the Pell grant 
program has exploded (see Figure 2). Pell spending grew by $15 billion between 2007-08 and 
2009-10 and was estimated to grow by another $5 billion by the end of the 2010–11 academic 
year (College Board, 2011). This rapid growth is driven by two factors: a rise in the number of 
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students attending college and an increase in the generosity of the program. The student 
population has grown both due to a demographic blip in the college-age population (Institute of 
Education Statistics, 2011) and a persistently weak labor market.  
 
Figure 3.2. Pell Enrollment and Expenditures Relative to 1976-1977 Levels 
Constant 2010 Dollars  
 
Source: College Board (2011), Figure 13A. 
 
 
The average Pell has risen sharply; this can occur because the marginal recipient is more needy 
or because the program has grown more generous. As we now show, the latter explanation is the 
most important one. In Table 3.2, we take full-time, undergraduate aid applicants in the 2007–08 
National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey and run their characteristics through the aid 
formulas for academic years 2003–04, 2007–08, 2009–10 and 2011–12.39 This analysis 
effectively holds constant student characteristics (income, schooling costs, etc.) while allowing 
the aid formula to vary. The average Pell for this sample of students rose from $1,417 in 2003–
                                                
39 More details about the NPSAS are provided in the Empirical Methodology section and Appendix 3.A. 
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04 to $1,673 in 2007–08, an increase of $256, or 18 percent. The increase between 2007–08 and 
2011–12 will be considerably larger. Using the 2011–12 Pell formula, we calculate an average 
Pell for this sample of students of $2,692, which is 60 percent ($1,019) more than these students 
received under the 2007–08 Pell formula. Nearly 60 percent of the students in the sample receive 
an increase of at least $500 under the 2011–12 formula, relative to the 2007–08 formula. These 
substantial increases in generosity account for $4.9 billion of the increase in Pell spending 
between 2007–08 and 2011–12.  
 
Table 3.2. How Aid Formula Changes Have Affected Pell Grant Targeting 
Predicted Values for 2007-2008 Undergraduate Aid Applicants 
  
2003–2004 
 
 
2007–2008 
Baseline 
 
2009–2010 
 
 
2011–2012 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Correlation with baseline Pell 0.978 1.00 0.950 0.922 
R2 0.956 1.00 0.902 0.850 
 
Share of applicants whose Pell     
…is within $100 of baseline 0.52 1.00 0.45 0.41 
…is within $500 of baseline 0.80 1.00 0.45 0.41 
…increases by $500 or more 0.00 0.00 0.55 0.59 
…decreases by $500 or more 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
Share with automatic zero EFC 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.22 
     
Average Pell ($, includes zeroes) 1,417 1,673 2,443 2,692 
Total Pell ($billion) 6.8 8.1 11.8 13.0 
Share Pell recipients 0.45 0.48 0.55 0.59 
 
Pell maximum ($) 4,050  4,310  5,350  5,550  
     
Notes: Sample consists of 34,920 undergraduate aid applicants enrolled at one institution for a full year during 2007-
2008 academic year. Students’ characteristics are run through aid formula for listed years to predict aid values. See 
Data Appendix for details. Analysis uses NPSAS weights (WTA000). Source: NPSAS:08. 
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 The increasing generosity of the Pell is largely driven by a rising “Pell maximum” (the 
grant that goes to students with an EFC of zero) paired with an expansion in the share of students 
who automatically qualify for this maximum. The Pell maximum rose from $4,050 in 2003–04 to 
$5,550 in 2011–12.40 The income ceiling on automatic qualification for the Pell maximum has 
doubled, from $15,000 in 2003–04 to $31,000 in 2011–12. Further, any household headed by a 
dislocated worker, or that receives a means-tested benefit in the previous two years, now 
qualifies for an auto-zero EFC and, thereby, the Pell maximum. 
 We graphically depict these changes in the generosity of the Pell in Figure 3.3. The 
sample again is full-time, undergraduate aid applicants in 2007–08. We calculate aid eligibility 
using the aid formulas for 2003–04, 2007–08, 2009–10 and 2011–12 and then plot the average 
values by income. The increasing generosity of the Pell is indicated by the rising intercept of the 
relationship between income and the Pell. There is a particularly sharp jump between 2007–08 
and 2009–10, when the Pell maximum rose by $1,040 (see Table 3.2). This increase in the Pell 
maximum did not only benefit the most needy students, but also increased Pell grants throughout 
the income distribution. This can be seen more clearly in Figure 3.4, which shows the Pell 
averages by income in 2007–08 (light bars) and the change in these averages by 2011–12 (dark 
bar).   
 These figures and calculations are not intended to demonstrate that the average Pell is 
now “too big.” Rather, our point here is that drastic change has occurred in the generosity of the 
Pell program, which throws into even sharper relief the halting progress in reducing the 
program's complexity. As we will show below, a radical simplification of the aid application 
process would cost only a fraction of what has been recently been spent by increasing the Pell 
maximum and the auto-zero EFC. 
                                                
40 These are the Pell maxima for full-time enrollment. Part-time students receive pro-rated grants. 
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Figure 3.3. Increasing Generosity of the Pell Grant, by Year and Income 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3.2. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Increases in Generosity of the Pell Grant from 2007-08 to 2011-12, by Income 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3.2.  
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It is also important to note that the new value of the Pell looks a lot less generous when 
viewed in historical context (Figure 3.2). The inflation-adjusted value of the maximum Pell, 
which had eroded over time, has now returned to its level when the program was established in 
the mid-Seventies. Even with this increase, the maximum Pell has less purchasing power than it  
did in the mid-Seventies, since tuition prices have risen much faster than inflation over the past 
few decades.  
3.5. What Could Be Changed? 
 
We have described the evolution of complexity in the aid system and recent efforts to 
reduce it. What are the possibilities for change going forward? Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 
(2006) showed, based on 2003–04 data, that the aid system could be massively simplified 
without compromising targeting in the Pell. Does this finding still hold? In this section we update 
the analysis of Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006) using 2007–08 data on student aid and aid 
applications. We estimate the marginal contribution of each FAFSA question to variation in Pell 
eligibility. We show that the vast majority of questions still have little impact on aid eligibility 
and could be eliminated with very little effect on the distribution of aid. We also examine the 
effect of using the previous tax year's 1040 data in the calculation of aid. If ED were willing to 
use the previous year's tax return to calculate aid eligibility, then all applicants could take 
advantage of the IRS-FAFSA link, thereby considerably streamlining the application process.  
3.5.1. Empirical Methodology 
 
Using data from the nationally representative 2007–08 National Postsecondary Student 
Aid Survey (NPSAS) (U.S. Department of Education, 2009a), we examine the relationship 
between federal aid received and information in the FAFSA.41 We focus on Pell Grants, since 
                                                
41 This description of the methodology used in the analysis is drawn from Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006). 
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they are the most expensive component of federal need-based aid. Our sample consists of 35,000 
dependent and independent undergraduates who attended college full-time for the full-year in 
2007–08 and who applied for federal aid (more details are provided in Appendix 3.A). The 
NPSAS sampling weights indicate that these observations represent about 5 million college 
students. 
 We first use the NPSAS to replicate the current distribution of aid. We calculate aid using 
the federal financial aid formula and compare these calculated aid amounts with their true values, 
which are given in the NPSAS. Our calculations of Pell Grants and EFCs are extremely close to 
their true values. Regressing the actual against the predicted values yields an R2 of 0.94 for the 
EFC and 0.84 for the Pell.42 These predicted values constitute the baseline against which we 
compare aid under various alternative simplification scenarios. 
 To measure the influence of the various data elements on aid, we sequentially exclude 
data items from the aid formula and recalculate aid, and then compare the new estimates to the 
baseline values whose calculation is described above. Mechanically, this is achieved by setting 
the value of the excluded items to zero (or, sometimes, to their mean). We measure the predictive 
power of these simulations with the R2 from regressions of the baseline aid values against their 
simulated values under simplification. We also plot average gains and losses against income.  
3.5.2. Using Fewer Data Items to Determine Aid Eligibility 
 
We start by throwing out all of the data used in the aid calculation except for items 
available on the IRS Form 1040. This opens the door to an application-free Pell, since eligibility 
could be calculated using IRS data alone. With this approach, we determine Pell amounts using 
the adjusted gross income of the parents and students, taxes paid, state of residence, family size, 
                                                
42 Unlike Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006), we do not exclude observations for which we cannot replicate the Pell 
or EFC within $1,000, even using all of the data and the exact federal aid formula. As a result, the R2 in these 
baseline regressions is slightly lower than in their tables. 
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parents’ and independent students’ marital status, type of income tax form filed, and number of 
family members in college. 
 The extensive data we drop in this simulation explain only ten percent of the variation in 
aid (Column 2, Table 3.3). With the few variables we include, we explain 89.6 percent of the 
variation in the Pell Grant. Our simulated Pell is within $100 of the baseline Pell (which we 
estimated using all of the items in the aid formula) for 78 percent of students, and within $500 of 
baseline for 88 percent of students. For 73 percent of FAFSA applicants, and half of current Pell 
recipients, the Pell does not change by even a dollar.  
 The changes in the distribution of the Pell resulting from this massive simplification of 
the aid form are depicted in Figure 3.5, where we plot average Pell against adjusted gross 
income. The light bars depict the average Pell for each income group, using the complete aid 
formula. The dark bars represent the change in the average Pell for each income group that 
results from using only IRS data to estimate aid eligibility. As is clear from the figure, the 
changes are extremely small. The average Pell for this population rises by $73 from a baseline of 
$1,673, or 4.4 percent. We estimate that overall Pell spending would rise by about $300 million 
for this population. These numbers are dwarfed by the increasing generosity of the Pell: as we 
showed earlier, recent changes in Pell generosity have boosted the average Pell by 60 percent, 
resulting in an increase in overall Pell spending of nearly $5 billion. 
3.5.3. Use Prior Year's 1040 to Determine Aid Eligibility 
 
All applicants, rather than just 24 percent, could benefit from the FAFSA-IRS link if the 
requirement were lifted that the applicant had already filed their 1040 for the most recent tax 
year. Alternatively, the FAFSA-IRS link could provide data from an earlier year's 1040. For 
example, a student applying in early 2012 for aid for 2012–13 could use IRS data from tax year  
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Table 3.3. Effect of Aid Formula Simplification on Distribution of Pell 
  
2007–2008 
Full FAFSA 
 
2007-2008 
IRS Data Only 
 (1) (2) 
     
Correlation with baseline Pell 1.00 0.947 
R2 1.00 0.896 
 
Share of applicants whose Pell   
…does not change 1.00 0.73 
…is within $100 of baseline 1.00 0.78 
…is within $500 of baseline 1.00 0.88 
…increases by $500 or more  0.07 
…decreases by $500 or more  0.04 
   
Average Pell ($, includes zeroes) 1,673 1,746 
Total Pell ($billion) 8.1 8.4 
   
Share Pell recipients 0.48 0.49 
   
Items required for calculation of aid 74 8 
      
Notes: See Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Effect of Using Only IRS Data to Define Pell Eligibility: 2007-08 Aid Year 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3.2.  
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2010 (rather than 2011) to complete her FAFSA. These data could be used to determine her final 
aid eligibility, or as a placeholder until the 1040 is filed for 2011. The latter is effectively what 
happens now: most applicants will complete their 2012–13 FAFSA before filing their 2011 
taxes, providing estimates of their 2011 tax data in their FAFSA application. They are then 
required to update their FAFSA once they file for the 2011 tax year.  
 As it stands, however, families manually enter these estimates. ED could instead port 
from IRS the 2010 tax data, which would serve as an estimate of the 2011 values. Applicants 
who are confident that their 2011 tax data will differ substantially from the 2010 values can 
choose to manually enter their information. As they do now, families would then receive an 
estimate of their aid eligibility based on the 2010 tax return. ED and IRS could automatically 
update these values when the 2011 tax form is filed, just as the individual applicant now does. 
While these may sound like minor administrative tweaks, these minor tweaks open the 
possibility of a nearly automatic aid application. As Kahneman and Tversky (2000) and Thaler 
and Sunstein (2008) argue, small differences in administrative requirements can produce 
enormous differences in outcomes.  
 This approach still leaves some uncertainty in final aid eligibility (though no more than 
currently exists), since aid may be changed once the 2011 tax form is filed. An alternative that 
would allow for both simplicity and certainty in the aid process would be to determine final aid 
eligibility based on the previous year's 1040. As we now show, this has little impact on the 
targeting of aid while increasing its simplicity and certainty. 
 In this analysis, we compare aid eligibility based on income from two adjacent tax years. 
For this exercise, we need to observe income in two consecutive years for a set of students.  
About half of the students in NPSAS who apply for aid for 2007–08 also apply for the following 
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year.43 We estimate 2008–09 aid amounts using the methodology described earlier, first using all 
of the elements in the aid formula and then just the subset of items available in the IRS data. We 
then replace the IRS data items that were reported on the 2008–09 FAFSA with those reported 
on the 2007–08 FAFSA. This simulates the effect of allowing 2008–09 applicants to use data 
from the 1040 they filed in 2007 (for the 2006 tax year), rather than from the 1040 they will 
eventually file in 2008 (for the 2007 tax year).  
 Table 3.4 shows the results. In Column 1 we show the baseline aid for this group of 
repeat filers for the 2008-2009 school year. Here, aid eligibility is calculated using the full 
FAFSA, which includes items gathered from the applicant’s 1040 for the 2007 tax year. In 
Column 2, we replace data from the 2007 tax year with data from the 2006 tax year.44 This 
simulates the effect of keeping all of the current FAFSA items while allowing all applicants to 
use the IRS-FAFSA link. The average Pell rises by $87, or four percent, while overall Pell 
expenditures for this population rise by $300 million. For 77 percent of applicants, the Pell 
remains within $500 of baseline. For 67 percent of applicants, and 44 percent of Pell recipients, 
the Pell does not change at all. These changes are plotted against income (from the 2007 tax 
year) in Figure 3.6. 
In Column 3 we examine the effect of eliminating all of the FAFSA items except for the 
2007 tax data. For this sample of repeat applicants (as was true for the full sample), restricting 
the aid formula to IRS data has little effect on aid eligibility, with 72 percent of applicants seeing 
                                                
43 Ideally, we would undertake this exercise for all students, and not just those who attend for two consecutive years. 
This would be possible if the 2007-08 NPSAS were matched with tax returns for the 2006 and 2005 tax years. Aid 
for 2007-08 could then be calculated using the “prior year” tax data from 2006 as well as with the “prior-prior year” 
tax data from 2005. 
44 We inflate these 2006 dollar values to 2007 values using the CPI, which was 2.8 percent between these two years. 
This prevents a mechanical increase in aid eligibility induced by inflation. 
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zero change in their Pell eligibility and 87 percent seeing a change of less than $500. When we 
replace the 2007 IRS data with data from one year earlier, the results change only slightly  
(Column 4), with 65 percent of applicants now seeing zero change in their Pell eligibility and 74 
percent seeing a change of less than $500. The average Pell for this group rises to $2,070, from a 
baseline of $1,941 (Column 1). Average changes are plotted against (2007) income in Figure 3.7. 
Pell spending for this population rises by $400 million, or a bit less than 7 percent, from its 2008-
09 baseline of $6 billion. These figures indicate that the price of an application-free Pell is a 7 
percent increase in expenditures. This number, while not inconsequential, is dwarfed by recent 
increases in Pell generosity.  
 
Table 3.4. How Does Using Older Income Data Affect Pell Eligibility? 
Estimates of 2008-09 Aid Using IRS Data from 2007 versus 2006 
 Full FAFSA Full FAFSA No FAFSA No FAFSA 
 2007 Tax Data 2006 Tax Data 2007 Tax Data  2006 Tax Data 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
         
Correlation with baseline Pell 1.00 0.858 0.951 0.837 
R2 1.00 0.736 0.905 0.700 
 
Share of applicants whose Pell     
...does not change 1.00 0.67 0.72 0.65 
...is within $100 of baseline 1.00 0.70 0.76 0.67 
...is within $500 of baseline 1.00 0.77 0.87 0.74 
...increases by $500 or more 0.00 0.14 0.07 0.16 
...decreases by $500 or more 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.10 
     
Average Pell ($, includes zeroes) 1,941 2,028 1,984 2,070 
Total Pell ($billion) 6.0 6.3 6.1 6.4 
     
Share Pell recipients 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.52 
     
Items required for calculation of aid 74 74 8 8 
     
 Notes: Sample consists of 20,280 aid applicants who filed a FAFSA in both 2007–2008 and 2008–2009. See Data 
Appendix for details. Simulation in Column 2 uses the same elements as Column 1 but uses 2006 instead of 2007 
tax information (AGI, earned income, taxes paid, type of income tax form used). Simulations in Columns 3 and 4 
drop the FAFSA and use only IRS data for the listed tax years. 2006 tax values are inflated to 2007 values using 
Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U).  
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Figure 3.6. Keep Current Formula, Allow All Applicants to Use IRS-FAFSA Link 
2008-09 Aid Year 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3.4. Corresponds to simulation in Column 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Eliminate FAFSA, Use Older Tax Data to Compute Pell Eligibility 
2008-09 Aid Year 
 
Notes: See notes to Table 3.4. Corresponds to simulation in Column 4. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
In 2006, Dynarski and Scott-Clayton hypothesized that complexity in the federal aid 
program was a barrier to college attendance. That paper also showed that the overwhelming 
majority of that complexity did nothing to improve targeting in the Pell Grant. Today, we know 
that complexity in the aid program is a barrier to college attendance. The FAFSA field 
experiment Bettinger et al. (2012) showed conclusively that a drastically simplified aid 
application process increases college attendance. In this experiment, the effect of a simplified 
application on college attendance rates was comparable to that of offering an applicant thousands 
of dollars in grant aid. Based on these results and a review of other interventions intended to 
increase college attendance, Dynarski et al. (2011) calculate that simplifying the aid process is 
(by several orders of magnitude) the cheapest way to increase college attendance.  
 In the face of this evidence, has the aid application process been simplified? There have 
been some successes. The user experience for the online FAFSA has been improved, with fewer 
repetitive questions and better skip logic. Online applicants are now offered an estimate of their 
Pell and Stafford eligibility, a major improvement over the past, when only the EFC was 
provided. In a major break through a longstanding administrative logjam, some applicants can 
now transfer their IRS tax data directly into their FAFSA from the IRS servers. All of these steps 
required sustained administrative energy and attention.  
 On the downside, the basic structure of the aid application process is unchanged. 
Applicants are still faced with a blizzard of paperwork. The FAFSA is just about as long and 
complicated as it was in 2006. For every two questions trimmed from the FAFSA, one more 
question has been added. As a result the FAFSA has shrunk only slightly (from 127 to 116 
questions), and is still longer than the tax forms completed by most taxpayers. The online 
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FAFSA, even with its improved user interface, involves 19 screens and just as many questions as 
the paper FAFSA. The IRS-FAFSA link, which has great potential to simplify the aid process, is 
hobbled by so many restrictions on its use that only 24 percent of applicants actually use it.  
 While there has been desultory progress in simplifying the aid system, the generosity and 
size of the Pell program have grown by leaps and bounds. Pell spending grew by $15 billion 
between 2007–08 and 2009–10 and was estimated to grow by another $5 billion by the end of 
2010–11 (College Board, 2011). Drastic change has occurred in the generosity of the Pell 
program, which throws into even sharper relief the halting progress in reducing the program's 
complexity. A fraction of the dollars spent increasing the Pell maximum could be used to 
drastically simplify the aid process, thereby making the dollars that are already being spent more 
effective in increasing college attendance. We spend tens of billions of dollars on federal student 
aid, and the bill is rising rapidly. Simplifying student aid is a “last-mile” reform that costs little 
but requires sustained political and administrative attention. 
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Appendix 3 
 
Appendix 3.A. Data Description 
 
We use individual-level data from the restricted-use version of the 2007-08 National 
Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS). NPSAS is representative of students filing for aid 
for the 2007–08 school year. A subset of students also files a FAFSA for 2008–09, and we limit 
the sample to this subset where indicated. 
 The NPSAS:08 includes FAFSA and financial aid data for 75,710 (11,199,083 survey-
weighted) undergraduate federal aid applicants. We limit the sample to 35,810 (4,951,822 
survey-weighted) students enrolled in one institution full-time for the full year during the 2007–
08 academic year. From this sample, 890 (138,858 survey-weighted) students were dropped 
because they are missing EFC or data elements needed to calculate EFC. This leaves a sample of 
34,920 (4,812,964 survey-weighted) undergraduate federal aid applicants for 2007–08. About 
half of these students filed a FAFSA for both the 2007–08 and 2008–09 academic years. For 
analyses in which we examine the reliability of older data for estimating aid, this yields a sample 
of 20,280 (3,079,184 survey-weighted) students. 
In Figures 3.3-3.7, we plot aid values against income. For these graphs, the sample is 
divided into twenty intervals. Each interval contains 3 to 6 percent of the sample, except for the 
top interval (over $80,000), which contains a quarter of the sample. 
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